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The Role of Politics in a Deliberative
Model of the Administrative State
Mark Seidenfeld*
ABSTRACT
Since at least the mid-1980s, some scholars of United States administra-
tive law have touted deliberative democracy as a promising theory to justify
the modern administrative state.  Those who advocate deliberative administra-
tion, however, have not easily incorporated the role of democratic politics into
their models of that state.
This Article begins by reviewing the historical development of the most
prevalent model of political influence on agencies—the presidential control
model—and summarizes arguments supporting that model.  It proceeds to
criticize the presidential control model for failing to promote the goals of a
deliberative regulatory state.  It then presents deliberative justifications for the
administrative state, but argues that agency rulemaking almost always involves
value judgments that can be justified only by invocation of political control.
Next, it reviews approaches to incorporating politics via public deliberation or
agency expertise, but concludes that none set out a workable role for politics
in the administrative state.  Finally, the Article attempts to develop such a
workable role, and ultimately suggests that, although political influence is es-
sential, such influence must be structured and exercised carefully in order to
maintain the deliberative advantages of administrative agencies.
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INTRODUCTION
Many students of government today believe that the American
political system has become dysfunctional.1  Congresspersons and
Senators seem focused only on maintaining their party’s control of
their respective houses or on wresting control of those houses and the
White House from the opposing party.2  Members of Congress are not
particularly motivated to further the interest of the country so long as
they believe that the resulting harm will be attributable to their oppo-
nents across the aisle rather than to their own party.3  Recent presi-
dents have announced policies that some claim are motivated more by
a desire to retain control over the White House than by a desire to
implement programs that will truly benefit the nation.4  The partisan
divide that pervades the halls of Congress has extended to the polity
1 See THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS:
HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EX-
TREMISM xii (2012) (stating that “[p]ublic trust in the government’s capacity to solve the serious
problems facing the country . . . hit record lows.”).
2 See id. at 102 (explaining that Republicans obtained “immense electoral success in 2010
after voting in unison against virtually every Obama initiative and priority”).
3 See, e.g., Jake Sherman, Sequester Blame Game as Leaders Head to White House, POLIT-
ICO (Feb. 28, 2013, 11:10 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/02/enough-sequester-blame-
to-go-around-88275.html (explaining how each party attempted to blame the other during se-
quester negotiations).
4 See Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking
in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 101–02 (1994) [hereinafter
Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron] (suggesting the timing of Reagan’s announcement regarding
the abortion counseling gag rule was intended to shore up the candidacy of George H.W. Bush
by “appeasing the religious right”); Julia Preston & John H. Cushman, Jr., Obama to Permit
Young Migrants to Remain in the US, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2012, at A1 (characterizing the Presi-
dent’s action as “a clear play for a crucial voting bloc in states that will decide whether he gets
another term”).
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itself,5 which seems more divided and insistent on no compromises,
leaving little middle ground for legislators to stake out and rendering
meaningful responses to regulatory problems unlikely.6
Those on different sides of regulatory issues have recently tried to
extend the dysfunction of America’s political process to the adminis-
trative state.  Groups fight for self-interested regulatory outcomes in
every possible arena.  This occurs in administrative hearing rooms,
where agencies create a record for their actions, and in courtrooms,
where the various stakeholders seek judicial review.7  But groups also
fight in the halls of Congress, at the White House, and even in the
shops on Main Street and the banks on Wall Street,8 all in an effort to
dictate or undermine agency policy decisions meant to implement stat-
utory schemes to protect the public interest.9  It is not enough for a
stakeholder group to convince the agency, via a deliberative process,
that its position best serves the public interest.10  Rather, groups seek
legislation to change the administrative process or selection of agency
heads to more securely benefit their own interests, without concern
about what is good for the nation.11  They also target campaign contri-
butions to induce key congressional committee members to pressure
agencies.12  They have even gone so far as to coordinate media cam-
5 MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 45–46 (explaining that a significant portion of the
electorate has “also been caught up in partisan polarization”).
6 See MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 51 (explaining that representatives from homo-
geneously partisan areas are more likely to accept “strategic partisan team play” by their repre-
sentatives because “[b]uilding and maintaining each party’s reputation dictate against splitting
the difference in policy terms”).
7 See Thomas O. McGarity, Administrative Law as Blood Sport: Policy Erosion in a
Highly Partisan Age, 61 DUKE L.J. 1671, 1675–76 (2012).
8 See id. at 1707–08.
9 See id. at 1761–62.  Many of these tactics are not entirely new.  Historically, powerful
members of Congress have weighed in on agency rulemakings in support of their constituents
interests.  See, e.g., D.C. Fed’n of Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe (Three Sisters Bridge), 459 F.2d 1231,
1235–36 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (discussing attempt by a House Committee Chairman to influence the
Secretary of Transportation’s decision whether to authorize a bridge from Virginia to Washing-
ton, D.C., through park land on the Three Sisters Island in the Potomac); BRUCE A. ACKERMAN
& WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR: OR HOW THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A
MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-SULFUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD
BE DONE ABOUT IT 100–02 (1981) (describing Senator Byrd’s interaction with the White House
and the EPA in support of a sulfur dioxide emission standard that would benefit the eastern
United States coal industry).
10 McGarity, supra note 7, at 1679.
11 See id. at 1679–80 (explaining that success in the regulatory arena can be achieved
through additional means, such as “preventing the confirmation of disfavored nominees” and
“whittling away [the agency’s] regulatory authority through rifle-shot riders attached to must-
pass legislation”).
12 See id. at 1693 (explaining how lobbyists contributed to congressional campaigns in or-
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paigns, often with claims of dubious veracity, to help increase political
pressure on agencies to adopt rules of their liking.13  In at least one
instance, for example, the banking industry acted strategically to im-
pose unjustified costs on their customers with the seeming intent of
generating a political backlash against an agency rule it disliked.14
Despite laments about the dysfunction of politics, the leading jus-
tification for the administrative state over the past two decades re-
mains the political control model.15  This is the latest in a series of
models that seek to legitimate agency authority to exercise discretion
and make value judgments inherent in the adoption of binding legal
rules.16  The political control model relies on control over agency exer-
cises of discretion by elected legislators and officials to warrant au-
thorizing agencies to adopt rules.17  Congress will delegate a
regulatory matter to an agency when the cost of implementing the en-
acting coalition’s preferred position by legislation exceeds the cost of
agency drift from that position.18  Congress can enact structural and
procedural provisions which constrain such drift, but cannot eliminate
it entirely.19  Following statutory enactment, in which the preferences
of both Congress and the agency model have been incorporated, each
new Congress will take measures to monitor and constrain deviations
from its preferred position.20  Similarly, the President will have a polit-
der to persuade bank regulators to pressure the Federal Reserve into implementing the Durbin
Amendment in an industry-friendly manner).
13 See, e.g., E-mail from Zen Magnets to Ed Richards (Nov. 18, 2012, 10:19 PM) (on file
with author) (asking Ed Richards, as a customer who bought magnets from Zen before, to file
comments opposing an FDA proposed rule banning small spherical magnets that could be swal-
lowed by children).
14 See McGarity, supra note 7, at 1702–03 (describing how Bank of America and Wells
Fargo announced a charge to holders of debit cards in reaction to Federal Reserve rules limiting
fees on debit card transactions, but abandoned imposing that fee when customers rebelled).
15 See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State:
A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV 47, 48 (2006) (describ-
ing the presidential control model of agency decisionmaking as “dominant”); Kathryn A. Watts,
Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 35 (2009)
(stating that the political control model of agency decisionmaking has “gained widespread
acceptance”).
16 See Watts, supra note 15, at 35.
17 See id.
18 DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A TRANSACTION
COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS 7–9 (1999).
19 See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Proce-
dures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 273–74 (1987) [hereinafter
McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures].
20 Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?
Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 791–92 (1983).
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ically preferred outcome and he too will act to monitor agency imple-
mentation in order to bring rulemaking closer to his preferred
outcome.21  According to supporters of the political control model,
such constraints can be sufficient to keep agency rules within bounds
acceptable to elected legislators and the President; they further con-
tend that the political accountability of these elected officials justifies
granting agencies discretion to enact politically controversial rules.22
To ensure sufficient political constraints, they advocate for increased
political influence, especially presidential influence, over agency
rulemaking.23  Such a move, however, could exacerbate the dysfunc-
tion of agency decisionmaking.
Scholars have suggested alternatives to the political control
model that seek to justify granting agencies rulemaking authority be-
cause of the potential for the administrative state to effectuate delib-
erative government.24  These alternatives suggest that agencies are
well suited to further the public good, determined by reasoned consid-
eration that takes into account the interests of all stakeholders.25  The
failure of such models to gain traction among political actors is under-
standable, given that current deliberative models do not recognize the
legitimacy of the roles of political institutions, at least as those institu-
tions currently play their roles.26  Deliberative models have also failed
to attract serious attention from the courts and most scholars of ad-
ministrative law, however, which is more surprising given the models’
21 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2298–99 (2001);
Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 81, 96 (1985).
22 See Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before
a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 567 (2003) (“[S]ome recent academic commen-
tary relies heavily upon the President as a major source of democratic responsiveness and ac-
countability for the . . . administrative state.”); see also Kagan, supra note 21, at 2334–39 (arguing
that presidential control will provide superior accountability of agency action to preferences of
the public).
23 See, e.g., Watts, supra note 15, at 8 (arguing that “what count as ‘valid’ reasons under
arbitrary and capricious review should be expanded to include certain political influences from
the President, other executive officials, and members of Congress, so long as the political influ-
ences are openly and transparently disclosed in the agency’s rulemaking record”).
24 See infra Part III.A. (describing and critiquing these alternatives).
25 See infra Part III.A.
26 See, e.g., David J. Arkush, Direct Republicanism in the Administrative Process, 81 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1477–79 (2013) (questioning Congress’ fitness for agency oversight); Mendelson,
supra note 22, at 663 (suggesting “the need to recognize more explicitly the President’s limita-
tions as a courier of public preferences and to thoroughly consider links between the public and
agencies, beyond the conventional path of voters to President to agency”).
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promise of shielding agency rulemaking from the dysfunctional con-
duct that plagues the current American political system.27
As an early proponent of a deliberative model of the administra-
tive state,28 I am disappointed by their failure to attract a greater judi-
cial and academic following.  But upon careful reading of the recent
work of advocates of deliberation, I believe that failure reflects
problems with the various conceptions of the deliberative state re-
cently proposed.29  In particular, recent proposals are unrealistic in
their optimism that the deliberative process can result in consensus
among stakeholders or their representatives in the rulemaking pro-
cess.30  They also elevate deliberation over democracy to the extent
that some invocations of the deliberative state seem to have written
democratic influence out of their depictions of the administrative state
entirely.31
Part I of this Article reviews the historical development of the
presidential control model and summarizes arguments supporting that
model.  Part II proceeds to criticize the presidential control model,
clarifying how it fails to promote the goals of a deliberative regulatory
state.  Part III of the Article presents the deliberative justifications for
the administrative state and identifies incorporation of politics as a
fundamental problem that deliberative models must solve.  It also ar-
gues that attempts to incorporate politics into a deliberative state—
27 See infra notes 195–211 and accompanying text.
28 See generally Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic
State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification]
(arguing for a civic republican understanding of the administrative state in which the govern-
ment enables citizens to deliberate about proper methods of achieving the common good).
29 See infra Part III.
30 See infra Part III.A.  In this Article, I focus primarily on policymaking via agency adop-
tion of legislative rules.  Rulemaking is the paradigmatic means by which agencies adopt policy.
See Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal Schol-
arship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 73 (2001) (“The principal procedure for formulating agency regula-
tions is notice and comment rulemaking . . . .”); see also Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms
in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 409–11 (1981) (describing the ascendency of
rulemaking as the prevalent means for agencies to make policy).  In some ways, however, one
can more easily justify a deliberative rather than political rationale for policy made via adjudica-
tion because politics is less appropriate as a basis for decisions in particular cases. See Mark
Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 AD-
MIN. L. REV. 429, 467 (1999) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules]; Watts, supra note 15, at
8 n.14.  But there are also aspects of the rulemaking process that make it easier to argue for a
deliberative rationale for policy made using this mode of agency action rather than adjudication.
Ultimately, for this Article, my focus on rulemaking is pragmatic; I have not thought through all
the implications of relying on deliberation to justify policymaking outside the rulemaking pro-
cess and hence do not opine on that issue here.
31 See infra Part III.C.
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whether via public or interest group deliberation or agency exper-
tise—are bound to fail.  Finally, in Part IV, the Article presents an
ideal role for political influence that helps legitimate the deliberative
administrative state.  It contends that, unfortunately, such a role can-
not be directly implemented in any legally enforceable manner.  The
Article, however, suggests some improvements in administrative law
doctrine—such as increasing the transparency of presidential influ-
ence on agency rulemaking and calibrating the rigor of judicial review
to the likelihood of presidential interference with agency deliberative
processes—that may help to reinforce agency rulemaking by delibera-
tion while allowing political influences to resolve value judgments un-
derlying such rulemaking.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL MODEL
A. Justifications for Agency Discretion Prior to the Political
Control Model
A brief historical account of justifications for the modern admin-
istrative state helps to illuminate the attraction of the political control
model, and ultimately, some problems with recent proposals for delib-
erative approaches to rulemaking.  At the turn of the 20th century, the
Progressive Movement and an increased presence of federal regula-
tion prompted questions about the administrative exercise of poli-
cymaking discretion.32  The initial justification for grants of such
discretion—known as the transmission belt theory—asserted that
agency decisions merely implement policies that Congress dictates in
statutes authorizing agency action.33  This theory was reflected in judi-
cial skepticism during the Progressive era about agency authority to
choose policy, and in courts’ characterization of agencies as similar to
judicial special masters, finding facts in technical and complex con-
texts and then objectively applying statutory provisions to reach ulti-
mate outcomes, subject to close judicial supervision.34  According to
this account, agency policymaking was legitimate because it did not
involve significant exercises of policy discretion.35
32 See Lisa Schlutz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 1749, 1759–60 (2007) [hereinafter Bressman, Procedures as Politics].
33 See id. at 1758; Mendelson, supra note 22, at 580; Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation
of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1675 (1975).
34 See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L REV.
1189, 1213 (1986) (noting that the judiciary conceived of the Interstate Commerce Commission
as an investigatory body “akin to . . . a court-appointed master or referee—a preliminary
factfinder”).
35 See Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justificaton, supra note 28 at 1516–17.
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The transmission belt theory may have been problematic even
within the context of delegated agency authority early in the 20th cen-
tury.36  In any case, that model’s claim to any degree of persuasiveness
vanished with the advent of the New Deal.37  By the mid-1930s, Con-
gress had authorized agency action to exercise discretion under broad
and imprecise statutory directives, such as to further “the public inter-
est, convenience, and necessity.”38  To justify broad and unstructured
delegations to agencies under the New Deal, supporters of the ex-
panded administrative state proposed the expertise model.39
According to the expertise model, although agencies exercise
policymaking discretion when adopting rules, that discretion is not
controversial because it does not involve the kind of subjective value
judgments that belong in the political realm.40  Instead, agencies’ dis-
cretionary decisions are dictated by their expertise.41  If only everyone
knew as much about the regulatory problem as the expert agency, all
would agree with the agency’s solution.42
Essentially, the model viewed agencies as politically disinterested
entities comprised of professionals whose decisions are driven by their
professional knowledge and training.  The idea was very much the way
people used to think of doctors in a much simpler and more trusting
time.  If you were sick, you went to the doctor; he examined you, fig-
ured out what was wrong, and prescribed the cure.  No one ques-
36 See id. at 1517.
37 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 471 (2003) [hereinafter Bressman, Beyond Account-
ability] (the transmission belt theory “simply did not describe the government we had after
about 1930”); Stewart, supra note 33, at 1677 (“[A]fter the delegation by New Deal Congresses
of sweeping powers . . . the broad and novel character of agency discretion could no longer be
concealed behind such labels.”).
38 See Jim Chen, The Death of the Regulatory Compact: Adjusting Prices and Expectations
in the Law of Regulated Industries, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1265, 1332 (2006) (noting that the Natural
Gas Act, the Federal Power Act, and the Federal Communications Act, all passed between 1934
and 1938, specified that agency action was to further “the public interest, convenience, and
necessity”).
39 See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 37, at 471 (stating that the expertise
model “soon arose to describe the virtues of bureaucratic government and to legitimate that
government in the absence of legislative directives”).
40 See Bressman, Procedures as Politics, supra note 32, at 1759 (explaining that under the
expertise model, the experts’ “professionalism would sufficiently discipline agency behavior and
allow them to deploy science and economics to produce sound policy”).
41 See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 10–24, 46, 91–100 (1938); PRESI-
DENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., ADMNINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES 324 (1937).
42 See Stewart, supra note 33, at 1678 (explaining that under the expertise model the analy-
sis conducted by the agencies had an objective basis).
2013] THE ROLE OF POLITICS 1405
tioned whether there was a better treatment, let alone whether the
doctor’s actions were motivated by some interest he might have
outside of the patient’s welfare.43
Not only were agencies’ policy decisions viewed as non-political
in nature, politics was seen as a corrupting influence on the agencies’
exercise of its expert judgment—something to be avoided to the ex-
tent constitutionally possible.44  New Deal agencies therefore were
“independent”—they were structured to insulate them from political
influence.45
The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)46 reflected a com-
promise between the traditional and expertise models.47  Agency adju-
dication was seen as involving the finding of “adjudicative” facts and
applying law to those facts, and thus was judicial in nature.48  Agency
rulemaking was seen as legislative in nature, but involved determining
facts and addressing problems, and the appropriate solutions flowed
from the technical knowledge and experience of the agency rather
43 Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 90
WASH. U. L. REV. 141, 151–52 (2012) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics]; see
also Stewart, supra note 33, at 1678 (stating that according to the expertise model, “persons
subject to the administrator’s control are no more liable to his arbitrary will than are patients
remitted to the care of a skilled doctor”).
44 JAMES O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 59–60 (1978) (reporting that political scientists had called for political
independence of agencies prior to the New Deal); LANDIS, supra note 41, at 113–14; SELECTED
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF JOSEPH B. EASTMAN 1942–1944, at 375 (G. Lloyd Wilson ed., 1948);
cf. MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 51–52 (1955)
(describing the relationship of the Progressive call for administrative independence to the New
Deal administrative state).
45 See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Indepen-
dence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 600, 610–11 (2010) (identifying limitations on presidential appoint-
ments, and dismissal of agency members of “[i]ndependent agencies, including New Deal
stalwarts such as the Federal Communications Commission (‘FCC’), the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (‘NLRB’), and the Securities and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’)”); Daniel J. Gif-
ford, The Emerging Outlines of a Revised Chevron Doctrine: Congressional Intent, Judicial
Judgment, and Administrative Autonomy, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 791 (2007) (stating that
Progressives believed the independent agency model “could incorporate nonpartisan technical
expertise”).
46 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006).
47 Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 477–78 (1986) (explain-
ing that the APA was a “compromise between those on the New Deal left desiring the domi-
nance of administrative discretion and expertise and those on the New Deal right seeking to rein
in the administrative state”).
48 See Sidney A. Shapiro, A Delegation Theory of the APA, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 89, 98
(1996) (stating that the compromise leading to the APA rejected reliance in expertise “where it
ma[de] the least sense—concerning ‘adjudicative’ facts that typify adjudication”).
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than from political accountability.49  Hence, under the APA, the politi-
cal branches were not envisioned as playing a direct role in agency
action—even in rulemaking.
By the 1950s and 1960s, scholars of administrative regulation be-
gan to question the assumption that agencies did not exercise political
discretion.  These scholars admitted that technical knowledge and ex-
perience were relevant to identifying and understanding the conse-
quences of agency policymaking, but they recognized that ultimate
decisions between policy choices depended on judgments about the
value of the trade-offs inherent in those decisions.50  Those value
choices do not flow from agency expertise, but rather are fundamental
choices about benefits and detriments that usually lie along incom-
mensurate dimensions.51  For example, the FCC policy preferring local
control over radio stations probably sacrificed greater quantities of
high quality programming in return for airing of issues unique to the
station’s locale.52  Additionally, except in rare cases, there is simply no
objective measure to compare the value of one versus the other.53  In
short, these scholars realized that agencies exercise discretion that re-
flects political choices.54
There were two reactions to this realization: pluralism and public
choice theory.  According to pluralism, the interests of the public are
best served by resolving conflicts between interest groups about policy
choices.55  The preferences of the polity are reflected by individual
49 See id. at 98 (explaining that the APA allowed the expert’s professional judgment con-
cerning “‘legislative facts’ that typify rulemaking”).
50 See MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMIN-
ISTRATION 4–5 (1988); Peter L. Strauss, From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of Amer-
ican Rulemaking, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 745, 755–56 (1996) (noting “a general social trend
that came to view agencies less as apolitical ‘experts’ administering a strictly rational process,
and more as political bodies making choices among alternatives in response to social needs and
political inputs”).
51 See Bressman, Procedures as Politics, supra note 32, at 1761 (stating that the expertise
model was criticized due to new views of social policies as not “amenable to correct solutions”).
52 See generally Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393
(1965) (emphasizing local ownership and control over factors such as efficiency of operation and
quality of programming).
53 See Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REV.
567, 584 (1992).
54 See id. at 583–84 (describing the shift to a political conception of the administrative
agency); Stewart, supra note 33, at 1683–84 (noting that agency decisionmaking came to be seen
as more political than technical as the interest group model replaced the APA compromise be-
tween the transmission belt and expertise models of administrative law).
55 See ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND
CONSENT 450–57 (1967); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTER-
ESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION 533–36 (1951).
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membership in various interest groups and by the resources that indi-
viduals provide to such groups to pursue their desired policies.56
Competition between groups provides a mechanism to allocate gov-
ernment benefits “efficiently,” that is, in a manner that grants the ben-
efits to those who value them most.57  Pluralists see within the
administrative state a means of registering the preferences of the vari-
ous interest groups with a stake in a rulemaking.58  They view
rulemaking proceedings as forums for bargaining between these
groups for the benefits that government can provide.59  The intensity
of an interest group’s participation in the administrative process sig-
nals the value of the benefit to its members, measuring the sum of the
strength of the interest to each of its members.60
Public choice theorists, however, see interest group representa-
tion as broken.  Government, having a monopoly over regulation, can
provide rents to interest groups by granting advantages to those
groups over their competitors.61  The administrative state, in their
eyes, merely facilitates such rent seeking.62  Moreover, focused inter-
56 See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 36–38 (1957) (explain-
ing how rational voters are guided by the benefits that they receive from the government); SHA-
PIRO, supra note 50, at 4–5 (explaining that interest groups were defined by a shared “particular
set of preferences”).
57 DOWNS, supra note 56, at 36–39.
58 See Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 32 (1998) (describing pluralist theory and its application to the administra-
tive state); Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification, supra note 28, at 1520–22 (explaining
how the administrative state was viewed as more capable than Congress to allocate regulatory
benefits in accordance with interest group preferences).  For an example of an attempt to justify
administrative power by appeal to the political theory of pluralistic democracy, see SAMUEL
KRISLOV & DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM, REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY AND THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL SYSTEM 24–25 (1981). See also STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM
351–52 (1982) (explaining that interest group representation is a justification for administrative
policymaking discretion).
59 See SHAPIRO, supra note 50, at 45 (describing how pluralism theory influenced the de-
velopment of rulemaking under the APA).
60 See Dorothy A. Brown, The Invisibility Factor: The Limits of Public Choice Theory and
Public Institutions, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 179, 182 (1996) (explaining that the interest group will seek
a legislative change when its costs amount to “one dollar less than the expected benefits from the
legislation”).
61 See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON.
807, 809–12 (1975) (modeling efforts to obtain government licenses as competition to secure a
monopoly); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3, 3–6 (1971) (arguing that regulation can provide benefits that only the government can
supply, such as legal restrictions on entry into the industry); see also DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUB-
LIC CHOICE II: A REVISED EDITION OF PUBLIC CHOICE 229–46 (1989) (describing the theory of
rent-seeking behavior and its application to the political process).
62 See Kagan, supra note 21, at 2265.
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est groups, such as industry, have great advantages in the competition
for such rents because they have lower costs of organizing and greater
access to relevant information,63 rendering their costs of participating
in rulemaking much lower than the costs borne by groups whose
members share diffuse interests.  The informational advantage of fo-
cused interest groups, especially repeat players like industry groups,
creates another advantage for them: the experts who make up the
agency staff often come from the industry, or go from the agency to
work for the industry, giving rise to allegations that agencies are cap-
tured by these groups.64  Given their outlook, not surprisingly, public
choice theorists expressed doubt that interest group representation
could be harnessed to force agencies to regulate in the public
interest.65
Courts responded to these two schools of thought on the interest
group model by liberally construing the APA’s rulemaking provisions
to equalize the playing field between the various groups.  Courts liber-
alized standing66 and held that agencies must provide broad access to
their proceedings.67  They also developed doctrines of meaningful no-
tice within informal rulemaking and reasoned decisionmaking under
arbitrary and capricious review, which mandates that agencies seri-
ously consider all relevant rulemaking comments, even those submit-
ted by people without detailed information regarding a proposed
rule.68  At the same time, interest group entrepreneurs began to or-
63 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THE-
ORY OF GROUPS 48 (rev. ed. 1971) (describing the factors that disfavor larger groups from fur-
thering their interests).
64 See David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 473, 497 (1999) (describing how agencies can be captured to facilitate the provision
of monopoly rents to well-organized interest groups).
65 Id. at 497–98.
66 SHAPIRO, supra note 50, at 45–46; Stewart, supra note 33, at 1725–34 (explaining that
“extension of standing to an increased range of affected interests is a judicial reaction to the
agencies’ perceived failure to represent such interests fairly”).
67 See Office of Commc’n of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1009 (D.C.
Cir. 1966) (finding appellants had a right to access proceedings for renewal of a one-year televi-
sion license).
68 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43,
50 (1983) (holding that agency must consider plausible alternatives to a rule and explain its
decision in terms of relevant factors); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d
240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that agency must provide information on which it relies to de-
velop a rule sufficient to allow meaningful comments on that information); see also SHAPIRO,
supra note 50, at 46–49 (describing the judicial creation of the idea of the rulemaking record,
requiring opportunities for interest groups to raise issues, and forcing courts to consider all such
issues on judicial review).
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ganize “public interest groups,”69 which represent those with diffuse
interests in rulemaking proceedings.  Even with these judicial “fixes,”
however, the administrative state fails to provide a mechanism by
which interest groups accurately signal the strength of support for
their preferred outcomes.70  Rulemaking continues to favor focused
interest groups that are repeat players in an agency’s proceedings.71
In addition, representation by interest group entrepreneurs raises
questions about agency costs between the leaders of such groups and
the members they purport to represent.72  By the start of President
Reagan’s administration, the time had come for a new justification for
the administrative state.
B. Political Control Models
1. Congressional Control
The political control model contends that electorally accountable
branches retain sufficient control over agency action to justify broad
statutory grants of policymaking discretion.73  Some scholars, most no-
tably positive political theorists (“PPT”), contend that Congress struc-
tures agencies and requires them to follow procedures that give
enacting coalitions advantages in administrative implementation of
regulatory statutes.74  Rulemaking procedures, judicial review, and the
69 See RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 35–37 (1982) (describing the significance of
“political entrepreneurs” in group coordination); JACK L. WALKER, JR., MOBILIZING INTEREST
GROUPS IN AMERICA: PATRONS, PROFESSIONS, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 41–55 (1991) (describ-
ing the role of policy entrepreneurs in mobilizing those with diffuse interests on questions of
policy); Robert H. Salisbury, An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups, 13 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 1,
11–15 (1969) (explaining how “entrepreneurs/organizers” invest the initial capital needed to
overcome barriers to collective action).
70 See, e.g., Bressman, Procedures as Politics, supra note 32, at 1762 (stating that the inter-
est group approach was criticized because “some groups appeared to have more say in the ad-
ministrative process than others”); Stewart, supra note 33, at 1771 (explaining that “unorganized
interests may remain at a considerable disadvantage . . . because their comparative lack of cohe-
sion and financial resources prevents them from having as effective representation as organized
concerns”).
71 See Stewart, supra note 33, at 1786.
72 See Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis
for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 434–39 (2000) [hereinafter Seidenfeld,
Empowering Stakeholders].
73 See Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: Power, Rational-
ity, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1814 (2012) (noting “a gathering movement to reconceptu-
alize the legitimacy of administrative agencies in terms of their political—and specifically, their
presidential—accountability as opposed to their expertise”); Kathryn A. Watts, Regulatory Mor-
atoria, 61 DUKE L.J. 1883, 1937–38 (2012) (stating that political control models “legitimize[ ]
federal agency action by stressing that agencies are subject to political control”).
74 Fundamental PPT work developing this thesis was done by Matthew McCubbins, Roger
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need to implement rules via costly licensing and enforcement proceed-
ings can be seen as means of providing such advantages, making it
difficult for agencies to act to the detriment of these coalitions.75  By
this argument, what some might characterize as capture may instead
be seen as intended interest group influence built into agencies’ au-
thorizing statutes.76  In addition, PPT scholars believe that Congress
retains significant control over agency policy via committee oversight,
the budget process, and even substantive legislation, which Congress
can use to overrule or otherwise penalize the agency if it adopts rules
that displease Congress.77  The desire to avoid the time commitment
and potential for bad press from an oversight hearing or a legislative
budget battle encourages agencies to act consistently with the prefer-
ences of the members of the oversight committee.78  The mere threat
of oversight hearings or budget cuts thus enables a fire alarm mecha-
nism, whereby the constituents and campaign contributors to influen-
tial committee members can complain to those members if the agency
adopts rules that adversely affect their regulatory interests.79
Congressional control as a justification for agency discretion,
however, is both positively and normatively contested.  Holding over-
sight hearings on regulatory matters is time consuming, and agencies
hold an advantage over Congress in terms of their knowledge about
Noll, and Barry Weingast. See, e.g., McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments
of Political Control, supra note 19, at 253–71; Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger B. Noll & Barry R.
Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Politi-
cal Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 468–81 (1989) [hereinafter McCubbins et al., Struc-
ture and Process].
75 See WILLIAM F. WEST, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING: POLITICS AND PROCESSES 188
(1985) (noting that the potential drain on agency resources of defending against a judicial chal-
lenge can give industry a lever to force concessions from the agency); McCubbins et al., Structure
and Process, supra note 74, at 442.
76 See Weingast & Moran, supra note 20, at 777–84 (explaining how FTC withdrawal from
aggressive regulatory positions reflected the influence of powerful congressional committee
members).
77 See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61,
121–44 (2006) (detailing congressional oversight of agencies); Jason A. MacDonald, Limitation
Riders and Congressional Influence over Bureaucratic Policy Decisions, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
766, 767–70 (2010) (reporting the common use of appropriations riders to negate agency policy
decisions).
78 See Beermann, supra note 77, at 70 (citing “adverse publicity” as an informal mecha-
nism through which Congress, or some of its members, influence agency decisionmaking).
79 See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984) (explaining how “fire-
alarm oversight” enables interest groups to signal when agencies have deviated from congres-
sional goals, reducing the cost of congressional control over agency policy).
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the matters about which they testify.80  In addition, passing statutes to
reverse agency policy is difficult, especially if the policy is supported
by the President.81  Thus, there is debate about the potential for signif-
icant congressional control over agency policy.
Normative questions arise because Congress exercises much of its
oversight via committees responsible for particular substantive regula-
tory areas.82  Unfortunately, there is no guaranty that the committee
shares the preferences of the entire chamber from which it hails.  Leg-
islators are members of committees in which their constituents and
those who fund their campaigns have a special interest.83  They there-
fore have a different incentive than legislators who are not on that
committee to encourage regulation that generates benefits for these
constituents and financial supporters.84  In essence, ceding policymak-
ing authority to agencies may enable committee members to use the
influence of oversight to exacerbate agency generation of monopoly
rents for their constituents rather than to constrain rent seeking.85
2. Presidential Control
In the mid-1980s legal scholars began to suggest presidential con-
trol over agency rulemaking as a justification for the administrative
state.86  Presidential control advocates essentially argue that such con-
trol will result in more transparent and accountable rules that are
80 See Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1293, 1323–24 (2012); Glen O. Robinson, Commentary on “Administrative Arrangements
and the Political Control of Agencies”: Political Uses of Structure and Process, 75 VA. L. REV.
483, 483–84 (1989) (arguing that it is extremely difficult for Congress to use agency procedures
and structure to “stack the deck” in favor of the enacting coalition); see also Steven P. Croley,
Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 33–34 (2000) (arguing that standardized
agency procedures might give a comparative advantage to “public interest law firms, the media,
the public, [and] government watchdog groups” vis-a`-vis Congress).
81 See Note, The Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2162, 2167
(2009) (“No President would, under ordinary circumstances, sign a disapproval resolution dis-
avowing a regulation that his own government had just enacted.”).
82 See Beermann, supra note 77, at 122 (explaining how oversight has “mushroomed” since
the development of subcommittees).
83 See Kagan, supra note 21, at 2260–61.
84 See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control Dele-
gated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1444–46 (2003).
85 Id. at 1449.  Each house of Congress, however, does have some mechanisms to ensure
committee fidelity to the preferences of the chamber as a whole, but exercising these mecha-
nisms is itself costly. See Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J. CON-
TEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 717, 763–64 (2005).  As a result, committee members will have some slack
to pursue their individual interests at the expense of the body as a whole.
86 See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 21, at 95–96; see also Bressman, Beyond Accountability,
supra note 37 at 485–91 (describing the rise of the presidential control model).
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more likely to serve the public interest rather than the preferences of
repeat players with focused interests.87
A strong argument for presidential control is political accounta-
bility.  Justice Elena Kagan, in an article written while still a professor
at Harvard Law School, claims that administrative officials, perma-
nent staffs of the bureaucracy, members of congressional committees,
and leaders of interest groups that “represent select and often small
constituencies” are “almost guaranteed by their composition and asso-
ciated incentive structure to be unrepresentative of national inter-
ests.”88  The President, in contrast, is accountable to all the voters and
hence is more likely to represent the national interest.89  Accountabil-
ity, however, is an imprecise term, and it pays to unpack its different
meanings.
One meaning is majoritarian accountability—that is, ensuring
that agency rules are consistent with the preferences of a majority of
the polity.90  Because the President answers to the entire electorate, to
be reelected or to ensure the political capital to carry out his more
general agenda, the President has an incentive to “consider carefully
the public’s views as to all manner of issues.”91  Those who advocate
presidential influence assert that although the President will not nec-
essarily act in accordance with the public’s preferences on any particu-
lar issue, and in many instances “may assign overriding weight to the
views of more particular, focused constituencies,” agency rules are
more likely to comport with broadly held public preferences if
rulemaking is subject to presidential control than otherwise.92
87 See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 37, at 490.  This Article does not ad-
dress constitutional arguments that the unitary executive requires that the President have full
control over agency rulemaking.  That question has been written on extensively. See, e.g., Steven
G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J.
541, 570–99 (1994).  For convincing textual, structural, and precedential arguments that the Con-
stitution does not mandate such control, see Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The
President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 702–04 (2007).
88 Kagan, supra note 21, at 2336 (emphasis removed).  Although Justice Kagan uses the
phrase only to describe members of congressional committees and subcommittees, it is an apt
description of all of the other contributors to the administrative process that she lists.
89 Id. at 2333–35; Mashaw, supra note 21, at 95–96.
90 Kagan, supra note 21, at 2335.
91 Id.; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in
Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469, 507–08 (1985) (“[T]here is every reason to expect that
Presidential policy decisions will reflect majoritarian political preferences. . . . Presidents are
elected presumably because they share the policy preferences of a majority of citizens.”).
92 Kagan, supra note 21, at 2336; see also Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Con-
trol of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53, 59 (2008) (“Scholars with diverse ideological and
methodological commitments have asserted that . . . bureaucratic policy should track
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Alternatively, the president might be accountable to interest
groups in a manner that is normatively desirable.  Recall that the plu-
ralist ideal is an allocation of regulatory benefits in accordance with
the number of people who have an interest in the allocation weighted
by the strength of each person’s interest.93  Because the President is
the sole executive branch officer who oversees all regulatory pro-
grams, he has an incentive to allocate the net benefits from all pro-
grams in a manner that maximizes the sum of those benefits.94
Essentially, his central position allows him to rationalize regulatory
goals across programs, taking into account the impacts of that agenda
generally on interest groups of all types throughout the nation.95
Yet another conception of accountability that presidential influ-
ence might further is what I call “representative accountability.”  By
some accounts, the electorate is extremely uninformed about the pre-
cise regulatory issues that might arise during a President’s term.96  A
presidential election is not a referendum on the public’s preferences
on particular regulatory matters, but rather a selection of the person
who the electorate believes likely to make the best choices on such
matters.97  The electorate does not focus on predictions of how a can-
majoritarian values and that this goal is best advanced by giving decision-making authority to the
most politically accountable officials, [which] impl[ies] the need for presidential control over
bureaucratic policymaking, because the president is the institutional actor most responsive to the
preferences of a national majority.”).
93 See supra notes 55–60 and accompanying text.
94 See Kagan, supra note 21, at 2339.
95 See id.
96 See ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA: CAN
CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? 17 (1998); see also Jane S. Schacter, Political
Accountability, Proxy Accountability, and the Democratic Legitimacy of Legislatures, in THE
LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 45, 47
(Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006); Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Coun-
termajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory,
89 IOWA L. REV. 1287, 1304–06 (2004).
97 Cynthia Farina describes this view of the President as “Representative-in-Chief,” but
she does not believe that the President can fulfill the role that this conception demands of him.
Cynthia R. Farina, False Comfort and Impossible Promises: Uncertainty, Information Overload,
and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357, 359–60 (2010).  The personal nature of
representative accountability does not render Congress irrelevant to regulatory value choices.
The domain of value choices open to the President is established in the first instance by statutes
authorizing regulation. See Aziz Z. Huq, Binding the Executive (by Law or by Politics), 79 U.
CHI. L. REV. 777, 791–92 (2012) (book review).  Moreover, in areas where further appropria-
tions are necessary, Congress can influence how the President exercises the regulatory value
choices open to him. Id. at 798–99; Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 Yale L.J. 1343,
1360 (1988) (“Appropriations limitations constrain every government action and activity and,
assuming general compliance with legislative prescriptions, constitute a low-cost vehicle for ef-
fective legislative control over executive activity.”).
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didate will vote on particular policy matters, but instead relies on
proxies, such as the candidate’s party, that indicate whether voters
generally can trust the candidate to vote as they would prefer when
policy choices present themselves.98  Voters may also rely on personal
traits, such as a candidate’s beliefs and integrity, as an indication of
whom they should trust to make regulatory decisions.99  The polity
need not know anything about those decisions or even envision that
any particular issue will arise.100  As the President’s term progresses,
the voting public will register favorable or unfavorable views of the
President as the totality of all of the President’s actions affect the
views of groups to which voters belong and voters’ own impressions of
whether the President remains worthy of trust as their designated rep-
resentative in the regulatory process.101  A President who seeks reelec-
tion or support for particular programs thus will choose rules with the
interests of the general public in mind.102
Representative accountability is not a precise mechanism for en-
suring that the President’s decisions will accord with the preferences
of the polity.103  Presidential control advocates do not contend that the
President will act strictly in accordance with his prediction of the pref-
erences of the voters on particular rulemaking controversies, or even
that he should.104  Rather, representative accountability simply ac-
knowledges that, in this age of candidate-centered politics, the Presi-
dent is chosen as the person that the polity has entrusted to use his
judgment to make choices of values underlying regulatory policy.105  It
98 LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, supra note 96, at 64 (explaining when candidates can use proxies
like reputation, party, or ideology to convince voters that they can be trusted).
99 See Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its
Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789, 1852 (2010) (lamenting that Presidents seem to get elected by
“personal and charismatic appeals”); Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-
Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH L. REV. 2073, 2078–81 (2005) (noting that people vote for a
candidate for president who shares their background and perspective, but arguing that this coun-
sels against presidential control of agencies).
100 See Rubin, supra note 99, at 2080 (noting that even Congress’ delegation to the FCC, as
broad and powerful as it is, would be unlikely to be a significant factor in a presidential election).
101 See Kagan, supra note 21, at 2335 (explaining why presidents still care about their public
perception even after they have been elected).
102 See id.
103 See id. at 2334.
104 See id. at 2334–36.
105 “Speaking directly to the people, and enlisting their support in what thereby becomes
the uniquely presidential enterprise of leading the country to safety and prosperity, modern
Presidents have emerged as ‘the single head of the government and moral leader of the nation
who speaks for and may be taken as equivalent to all the people.’”  Farina, supra note 97, at 359
(quoting BARBARA HINCKLEY, THE SYMBOLIC PRESIDENCY: HOW PRESIDENTS PORTRAY THEM-
SELVES 134 (1990)).
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also asserts that elections—including elections other than those for
President106—provide a mechanism to encourage the President to take
into account his estimation of “voter sensibilities” when making judg-
ments about which rules are best for the nation.107  In terms of legiti-
mating executive action, representative accountability is weak in the
sense that it provides a limited constraint on Presidential conduct, but
powerful in its assertion that there is no government institution that
has a stronger claim to make regulatory judgments that are inherently
political.
In addition to accountability, a second argument for presidential
control is that centralization can overcome regulatory inertia and co-
ordination problems.108  The President, a political actor with a desire
to get reelected or create a historical legacy, has an agenda that he will
work to implement.109  Individual agencies have incentives and au-
thority only to resolve regulatory issues within their statutorily as-
signed jurisdiction.110  Congressional committees will have the same
limited domain and parochial interests that undermine coordination
of the nation’s regulatory agenda.111  The President, by contrast, being
responsible for all regulatory programs, has the incentive and the au-
thority to ensure that various agencies’ regulatory programs do not
work at cross purposes.112  Although Congress as a whole has univer-
sal jurisdiction over federal programs—so one might suspect that con-
gressional control too would ensure consistency of programs across
agencies113—Congress is made up of many members with differing in-
centives, and must overcome coordination problems to act centrally.114
106 Congressional elections affect the ability of the President to implement his agenda,
which may reflect a myriad of factors including the prospect of his reelection, his historical leg-
acy, and his commitment to a particular ideology. See Kagan, supra note 21, at 2334–35.
107 Jon D. Michaels, The (Willingly) Fettered Executive: Presidential Spinoffs in National
Security Domains and Beyond, 97 VA. L. REV. 801, 845–46 (2011).
108 See Kagan, supra note 21, at 2340–41.
109 See id. at 2335.
110 See Thomas O. Sargentich, The Emphasis on the Presidency in U.S. Public Law: An
Essay Critiquing Presidential Administration, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007); see also Lloyd N.
Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395, 1405–06
(1975); Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1081 (1986).
111 See Ronald M. Levin, Administrative Discretion, Judicial Review, and the Gloomy
World of Judge Smith, 1986 DUKE L.J. 258, 270; Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the
Deterioration of Regulatory Policy, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 15 (1994).
112 See Kagan, supra note 21, at 2340; Sargentich, supra note 110, at 4.
113 See Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist President and the Parochial Congress, 53
UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1250–53 (2006) (arguing that the collective nature of congressional action
increases its ability to evaluate competing claims of interest groups).
114 See Adrian Vermeule, The Invisible Hand in Legal and Political Theory, 96 VA. L. REV.
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The President, being a single individual, does not have to overcome
coordination problems to act.115  The President is thus uniquely situ-
ated not only to coordinate rulemaking activity, but also overcome
inertia that might otherwise interfere with such coordination.116
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL MODEL
A. Accountability
As noted previously, accountability is susceptible to several
meanings, and presidential control poses different problems for the
different notions of accountability.
1. Majoritarian Accountability
Supporters of the presidential control model are overly confident
in the electoral process’s ability to cabin the President’s policy
choices.117  Most voters are unaware of regulatory issues, even those of
significant import,118 and even voters who are aware may not be
knowledgeable enough to understand the trade-offs inherent in one
choice of a rule versus another.119  Moreover, these voters are subject
to being misled about the implications of potential rules by presiden-
tial “spin.”120  The mix of potential regulatory issues also is too com-
1417, 1428–29 (2010); see also Michael A. Fitts, The Paradox of Power in the Modern State: Why
a Unitary, Centralized Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or Legitimate Leadership, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 827, 829 (1996) (“[P]roponents of a strong president argue that a government more
directly controlled by a single decisionmaker—that is, a strong unitary executive—frequently
avoids many of the collective action problems endemic to legislative bodies or dispersed govern-
ment organizations, such as Congress or a plural executive.”).
115 See Kagan, supra note 21, at 2341.
116 See id.
117 See Nina A. Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1352–54 (2011).
118 See MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT
POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 79–82 (1996) (explaining results of surveys showing that large
portions of the public are often unaware of several relevant legal and regulatory issues); Nzelibe,
supra note 113, at 1254; cf. Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 1253, 1267 (2009) [hereinafter Staszewski, Reason-Giving] (“If citizens do not know about
the existence of a policy issue, they will probably not have formed any meaningful preferences
on its most desirable resolution.”).
119 Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in
Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 441, 448 (2010); cf. Craig M. Burnett, Elizabeth Garrett &
Matthew D. McCubbins, The Dilemma of Direct Democracy, 9 ELECTION L.J. 305, 320 (2010)
(noting that voters do not have a full sense of tradeoffs involved in ballot initiatives).
120 See Neal Devins, Signing Statements and Divided Government, 16 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 63, 76–79 (2007) (contending that during times of divided government, the President
should act unilaterally to implement his policy agenda, which requires that he spin legislation by
a signing statement or executive order); see also Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Consti-
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plex for elections to hold the President directly accountable for any
single decision except potentially the most salient political contro-
versy.121  Perhaps most damning, voters do not seem to vote for presi-
dential candidates based on the issues at all, but rather engage in
candidate-centered politics.122  It is therefore overly optimistic to ex-
pect electoral politics to force the President to choose the rule pre-
ferred by a majority of voters.
In addition, the President has significant ability to maintain pub-
lic support even if he does not comply with the preferences of the
majority.  “Policy preferences are necessarily bundled in a single vote,
‘preclud[ing] any facile translation of election results into ‘the people’s
will’ on specific policy issues.’”123  For example, most people do not
decide for whom to vote for President based on any single issue even
if they have preferences about that issue.124  Because the President
maintains authority over all regulatory matters, he therefore need
only please a majority of the electorate on average to maintain politi-
cal support.125  That is, on any particular issue, he can deviate greatly
from what an informed public would find to be the best policy so long
as on other issues he deviates in ways that will placate those dissatis-
fied with his policy on the first issue.126  As Matthew Stephenson
nicely modeled, it is possible that more insulated decisionmakers,
tutional Law, and Platforms For Judicial Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 909, 919 (2006) (men-
tioning President Lyndon Johnson’s positive spin on military progress in Vietnam); Maura
Reynolds & James Gerstenzang, Updating His Spin on Climate Change, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11,
2007, at A30 (reporting that President George W. Bush spun the Kyoto Protocol as “fatally
flawed in fundamental ways”).
121 See Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Com-
plex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987, 997–98 (1997) (noting that there is a “bundling problem”
in that voters have to accept or reject all of the President’s policies when they vote); Nina A.
Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L REV.
1127, 1160 (2010) (“[H]olding a President accountable for particular agency decisions is hard . . .
given the infrequency of elections, the number of issues typically on the agenda at the time of a
presidential election, presidencies that only last two terms, and presidential candidates who are
vague about how the administrative state would run.”).
122 See Francis Rourke, Presidentializing the Bureaucracy: From Kennedy to Reagan, in
THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY 123, 126 (James P. Pfiffner ed., 1991) (remarking that the candi-
date-centered nature of politics undermines a President’s claim to an electoral mandate); see also
Criddle, supra note 119 at 457–60 (identifying other problems with a President translating an
electoral victory as support for his policies).
123 Note, Deweyan Democracy and the Administrative State, 125 HARV. L. REV. 580, 592
(2011) (quoting Farina, supra note 121, at 998).
124 See Kagan, supra note 21, at 2334 (“[B]are election results rarely provide conclusive
grounds to infer . . . support for even that candidate’s most important positions, much less the
sometimes arcane aspects of regulatory policy.”).
125 Stephenson, supra note 92, at 77–79.
126 Cf. Kagan, supra note 21, at 2334–36 (explaining that elected presidents engage in a
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whose support depends on outcomes to policy decisions within a nar-
row ambit of issues, will perform better than the President will.127  Es-
sentially, the President is like an archer aiming at a target whose
bull’s-eye represents the majoritarian preferences of the voters.  His
arrows may scatter widely but not systematically around the bull’s-eye
of a target, while those of the agencies may consistently come closer to
the bull’s-eye, albeit missing in one particular direction.128  The Presi-
dent will not pay a price for his imprecision so long as the center of
the placement of arrows is fairly close to the bull’s-eye.129
2. Interest Group Accountability
Although the President has universal regulatory jurisdiction, and
answers to the entire electorate, our political system biases even the
President towards focused interest groups.130  The criticism leveled by
public choice theorists is not limited to agencies or Congress.  The
truth about current electoral politics is that the President has great
incentives to please powerful interest groups131 that can deliver large
blocks of voters, either by their members’ identification with the
group and hence the members propensity to vote as group leaders tell
them, or by the group’s ability to contribute generously to the presi-
dential candidate’s campaign.132  This is true even for a second term
President who does not face reelection.133  A second term President
“permanent presidential campaign” in which they must carefully weigh the policy preferences of
the electorate).
127 Stephenson, supra note 92, at 73–74.
128 Id.
129 See id.
130 See Glen Staszewski, Political Reasons, Deliberative Democracy, and Administrative
Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 849, 870 (2012) [hereinafter Staszewski, Political Reasons].
131 See id. (asserting that public choice theory suggests that the President will favor special
interest groups).
132 Jessica Mantel, Procedural Safeguards for Agency Guidance: A Source of Legitimacy for
the Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 343, 373 (2009) (“[E]lectoral considerations may
cause members of Congress and the President to pressure agencies into adopting policies
favorable to powerful special interest groups.”); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cog-
nitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 564–65 (2002)
(arguing that interest groups “can finance [a legislator’s] reelection bid and, possibly, mobilize a
bloc of voters by alerting them to the legislator’s efforts on their behalf”); see also Ciara Torres-
Spelliscy, How Much Is an Ambassadorship? And the Tale of How Watergate Led to a Strong
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and a Weak Federal Election Campaign Act, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 71,
102–05 (2012) (arguing that problems of quid pro quo bargains for campaign contributions were
revealed by Watergate tapes, and that more forgiving legal constraints on such contributions to
promote presidential candidates today suggest the need for reform of campaign contribution
laws).
133 See Kagan, supra note 21, at 2235.
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usually wishes to implement signature programs or desires to secure a
place in history.134  Neither is easily accomplished without gaining sup-
port of key players in Congress, which in turn will encourage the Pres-
ident to provide regulatory benefits to groups preferred by those key
members.135
Even if the President was not motivated to placate focused inter-
est groups, he would have a hard time resisting their influence.136  To
create and implement many administrative rules, one needs a huge
quantity of information about how the activity to be regulated oper-
ates.137  Generally, regulated entities can obtain such information
more easily than both the public and regulators.138  Manufacturers
have superior information about their products and methods of pro-
duction, making it likely that they know better than anyone else the
direct costs of complying with particular regulatory requirements in
areas such as the environment and maybe even about the impacts of
failing to comply.139  Agencies at least have staffs of professionals who
can obtain such information from stakeholders and understand its
technical significance.140  Those in the White House and the Executive
Office of the President (“EOP”) who engage in regulatory review, al-
though politically astute and trained in policy analysis, depend on the
agency and stakeholders with whom they interact for specific informa-
134 See id.
135 See Huq, supra note 97, at 794–95, 798–99 (concluding that Congress plays a robust role
in delimiting presidential discretion and impeding presidential agendas); see also Jide O. Nzelibe
& Matthew C. Stephenson, Complementary Constraints: Separation of Powers, Rational Voting,
and Constitutional Design, 123 HARV. L. REV. 617, 631–36, 649–50 (2010) (modeling how the
President may prefer to seek congressional support for a policy to avoid voter backlash).
136 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Response, Presidential Control Is Better than the Alternatives,
88 TEX. L. REV. See Also 113, 119 (2009), (asserting that “government can do nothing important
unless the President makes deals with special interests”).
137 See, e.g., John S. Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap: Balancing the Supply and Demand
for Chemical Information, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1365, 1365 (2008) (noting that the informational
demands of risk regulation of toxic chemicals exceeds the available information); Bradley C.
Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information Deficits in Environmental Regula-
tion, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1421–22 (2008) (describing the enormous “informational demands
placed upon agencies seeking to establish health-based regulatory standards”).
138 See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The Attempt to Reform Wall
Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 2012 BYU L. REV 73, 138
(noting that agencies “depend[ ] on industry to provide information about” the workings and
capabilities of the industry); Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, The Benefits of Capture, 47 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 569, 596 (2012) (“[O]ften the best information about what is going on in a given industry
is in the hands of members of that industry.”).
139 Karkkainen, supra note 137, at 1412 (noting the information advantage of industry
about production processes and pollution control technologies); Reiss, supra note 138, at 596–98.
140 Reiss, supra note 138, at 597–98.
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tion about agency rules.141  As such, they might be susceptible to selec-
tive revelation and manipulation of data by interest groups that can
obtain and analyze information at relatively little cost.142
The fact that the President answers to the entire electorate will
not significantly constrain bias toward special interest groups for the
same reason it will not induce the President to choose those regula-
tory outcomes preferred by a majority of voters.143  One might posit
that the ignorance of the electorate can be overcome when one con-
siders interest groups because voters will use the position of interest
groups in which they are members as proxies for deciding for whom to
vote for President.144  The influence of interest groups, however, is in-
sufficiently precise for the positions of such groups to provide accu-
rate signals to voters.145  Assuming that most people are not single
issue voters, each must weigh the input of interest groups in her
calculus of deciding for whom to vote.  But an interest group generally
just signals whether it supports or opposes a candidate based on
whether that candidate supports the group’s interest.146  Such signals
are insufficiently nuanced to allow an individual voter to obtain an
accurate signal of how she should vote.  To understand why, consider
a two-issue voter who is most concerned with reducing the federal
debt, but is also almost as interested in protecting the environment.
141 See S. COMM. ON ENV’T AND PUB. WORKS, 99TH CONG., OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET INFLUENCE ON AGENCY REGULATIONS 19 (Comm. Print 1986) (explaining that the
Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) does not have the resources to generate data
needed to analyze EPA rules); Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1785–86, 1806–07 (2013) (noting that the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) coordinates review of the agency’s cost-benefit analysis and stat-
ing that presidential review is meant in part to mitigate information asymmetries between the
agency and the President). See generally Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit
Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137 (2001) (modeling cost-
benefit analysis as an information-forcing mechanism).
142 See Reiss, supra note 138, at 597–98.
143 See supra notes 123–29, and accompanying text.
144 Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delega-
tion, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1979 n.194 (2008) (“Political
parties and special interest groups provide information about candidates that help voters reduce
information costs, but do not provide a perfect proxy for knowledge of candidates’ true position
on policy issues.”); Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 132, at 565 (discussing interest group
influence).
145 See Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence
Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1159 (2003) (explaining
situations in which interest groups have an interest in not disclosing their positions to the voters).
146 See John Ferejohn, Playing with House Money: Patriot Dollars Considered, 91 CALIF. L.
REV. 685, 702–03 (2003) (noting that “single-interest groups” provide signals for voters about
candidates, but that voters would have a hard time “sorting them out” without political parties as
guidance).
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Suppose Tax Watch decides that it prefers candidate A over candidate
B very slightly on the prospect of reducing the debt.  It announces,
therefore, that it supports candidate A and opposes candidate B.
Meanwhile, Sierra Club determines that the position of candidate B
on environmental issues is far superior to candidate A on environ-
mental issues.  It announces that it supports candidate B.  Our two-
issue voter will vote for candidate A because she values debt reduc-
tion more highly than environmental protection.  But this is probably
the incorrect conclusion for this voter, because the difference between
the candidates on debt reduction is small compared to their differ-
ences on the environment.
3. Representative Accountability
Although this notion of accountability supports the President as
having the strongest claim to make political value judgments inherent
in regulation, there are some limitations to this notion as a justifica-
tion for the current extensive federal administrative state.
As a preliminary matter, representative accountability alone can-
not justify the administrative state because the President can person-
ally exercise judgment in only a small proportion of agency
policymaking.147  In other cases, White House influence on rulemak-
ing either does not occur, or it is dictated by the “institutional presi-
dent”—that is, staff members in offices in the White House or the
EOP (including OIRA) acting in accordance with their beliefs about
the President’s preferences.148
Of course, the President has plenary power to choose White
House staff,149 while appointment of senior agency staff depends on
Senate confirmation150 and that of career staff depends on require-
ments of the civil service system.151  And, presumably the President
147 GLEN O. ROBINSON, AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY: PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 103
(1991); see also Harold H. Bruff, On the Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36
AM. U. L. REV. 491, 509 (1987); Mark Seidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach to Presidential Influ-
ence on Agency Policy-Making, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1, 14 (1994) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, A Big
Picture Approach].
148 See Nou, supra note 141, at 1761 (“Presidents delegate regulatory review to a number of
agents, mostly within the Executive Office of the President, who themselves disagree and con-
flict over what the President desires.”).
149 Seidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach, supra note 147, at 14.
150 Id. at 39 n.203.
151 See Michael K. Grimaldi, Abolishing the Prohibition on Personal Service Contracts, 38 J.
LEGIS. 71, 77–78 (2012) (explaining the limitations on employment of civil servants and how
these limitations are sometimes circumvented through contractors).
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chooses White House staff to implement his vision of what is best.152
But other than direct monitoring of staff decisions by the President,
there is no mechanism to ensure the fidelity of staff members to what
the President would dictate.153  In most cases, when there is no strong
evidence of the President’s preference, an EOP or White House staff
member with the technical background to oversee a particular agency
action will exercise her own judgment in predicting his preference.154
Thus, influence on agency action by “presidential review” often will
not reflect the judgment of the President himself.155  This lack of per-
sonal presidential involvement undermines the argument that repre-
sentative accountability legitimates allowing the White House to make
ultimate choices of regulatory policy.
Even when the President does take personal responsibility for an
agency rule, there are normative questions about the merits of repre-
sentative accountability, given that it seems to require recognition that
the President can exercise stronger control over agency action than
has been countenanced in the past.  The President personally does not
have the technical expertise to identify and understand the trade-offs
predicated by an agency rulemaking.156  He can surround himself with
experts to instruct him on such matters, but even their access to infor-
mation and expertise will not compare favorably with that of the
agency staff.157  He would have no way of knowing whether his staff’s
predictions and analyses were accurate,158 and even experts are prone
to overconfidence that their perspective is best.159  In addition, as a
152 See Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs:
Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1845–46 (2013) [hereinafter Sunstein, Myths and
Realities].  This presumption, however, does not extend to any but the top staff members in the
EOP.  Others working in EOP are career staff who remain in their jobs even when the President
leaves office. Id. at 1845.
153 See ROBINSON, supra note 147, at 102 (noting that deviations between executive over-
seers and the President “present the same type of monitoring and control problems . . . as the
agencies they seek to influence”).
154 Nou provides an enlightening description of the interaction between agencies and of-
fices in EOP and among those offices, which illustrates how presidential review reflects the judg-
ment of staff members and the relationships between them.  Nou, supra note 141, at 1793–97.
155 See ROBINSON, supra note 147, at 102–03.
156 See Kagan, supra note 21, at 2355–56 (recognizing that technical decisions by agencies
are not commonly reversed by the President or his staff).
157 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
158 See Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 132, at 601 (“The President is the most overworked
and underinformed decisionmaker in the American policymaking system.”).
159 Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Con-
fidence, 24 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411, 412 (1992); Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 132, at 560.
The entire effort of presidential review may decrease errors from agency overconfidence, Rach-
linski & Farina, supra note 132, at 590, although perhaps at the expense of other cognitive limita-
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political actor, the President is likely to evaluate rules from a political
perspective—gauging the likely reaction of not only the electorate,
but also of his supporters and campaign contributors.160  In that sense,
presidential decisionmaking is inherently non-deliberative.161  Finally,
the President brings his own values to bear on issues, but may not be
aware of competing perspectives.162  One antidote to this lack of in-
herent deliberation would be to require the President to consult ex-
perts with different experiences and viewpoints and to give reasons
for the rule he ultimately chooses.  It seems that some of the presi-
dents whom history regards most highly did engage in deliberative
decisionmaking, at least on the most important issues confronting
them.163  But such presidents appear the exception, not the rule—per-
haps because deliberation is demanding, time consuming, and does
not necessarily pay political dividends.164  Whatever the reason, the
lack of expertise and deliberation calls into question the value of di-
rect presidential control over rulemaking.
tions on decisionmaking, id. at 601 (“Attempting to involve [the President] significantly in the
range of policy decisions that can be more deliberative is likely to be inefficiently distracting and
substantively counterproductive.”).
160 See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 37, at 504.
161 See id.
162 See Mendelson, supra note 117, at 1353–54 (“[T]he electoral process and the necessity
of negotiating with Congress are likely to provide the President with only a partial incentive to
consult the wide range of views one might think necessary for ‘democratic responsiveness’ under
either a pluralist or civic republican view.”).
163 See generally DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: THE POLITICAL GENIUS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN xvi–xvii (2005) (describing President Lincoln surrounding himself with a
cabinet of highly regarded individuals who did not share his background or perspective on slav-
ery and the union, and in fact were his political rivals).
164 A more accurate picture of the barriers to the President’s ability to act deliberatively is
captured by the portrait painted by presidential scholar Hugh Heclo:
Our most familiar image of the presidency finds a man, sitting alone, in the dimly lit
Oval Office.  Against this shadowy background the familiar face ponders that ulti-
mate expression of power, a presidential decision.
It is a compelling and profoundly misleading picture.  Presidential decisions
are obviously important.  But a more accurate image would show a presidency
composed of at least a thousand people—a jumble of personal loyalists, profes-
sional technocrats, and bureaucratic staff with one man struggling, often vainly, to
stay abreast of it all.  What that familiar face ponders in the Oval Office is likely to
be a series of conversations with advisers or a few pages of paper containing several
options.  These represent the last distillates produced from immense rivers of infor-
mation flowing from sources—and condensed in ways—about which the president
probably knows little.
Hugh Heclo, The Changing Presidential Office, in THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY, supra note
122, at 34.
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B. Centralization of Control
Concentration of power in a single individual, responsible for all
the regulatory policies of the nation, facilitates coordination of various
regulatory programs and can help overcome barriers to rulemaking.
Supporters of presidential control, however, may underestimate the
ability of agencies to overcome inertia and coordination problems.
For example, Justice Kagan describes the Food and Drug Administra-
tion’s (“FDA”) promulgation of rules governing the sale of cigarettes
as President Clinton’s program.165  The impetus for the rule, however,
came from the agency itself, which invested its resources heavily to
establish that cigarette manufacturers manipulated the dose of nico-
tine delivered by each cigarette—the factual premise that it believed
justified FDA jurisdiction over such sales—well before Clinton had
signed on to the project.166  Perhaps a more plausible argument is that
the President may enable an agency to overcome congressional oppo-
sition to a rule that reflects special interest influence on Capitol Hill
by taking personal responsibility for the rule.167
Moreover, overcoming barriers to coordination by concentrating
power in the President comes at the price of potentially upsetting the
balance of power between the branches of government that was in-
tended to slow down the legislative process and discourage unwise
and short-sighted legislation.168  The bicameralism and presentment
165 Kagan, supra note 21, at 2282–83.
166 See DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A
DEADLY INDUSTRY 331–33 (2001).  At times, an agency may even be too eager to regulate a
matter that is not politically supported, as appeared to be the case when the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) required automobile manufacturers to install ignition
interlocks that prevented a driver from starting her car unless the seatbelt was fastened.  After
great public outcry, Congress overruled that rule and prohibited NHTSA from using an ignition
interlock as part of any future rule. See Taylor v. Gen. Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 823 (11th Cir.
1989) (summarizing the history of the ignition interlock system).
167 Kagan, supra note 21, at 2307.
168 As John Manning explains, the
cumbersome process of bicameralism and presentment serves several related inter-
ests: It makes it more difficult for ‘factions’ to capture the legislative process; it
restrains passion and promotes deliberation . . . and it creates a bias in favor of
filtering out bad laws by raising the decision costs of passing any law.
John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 899 (2004); see also John O.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a Constitutional Solution, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 365, 387–88 (1999) (explaining that bicameralism discourages rent seeking be-
cause “those seeking private interest spending have to obtain a majority in not one but two
legislative bodies”).  John Manning has suggested that notice and comment procedures serve
these same interests.  Manning, supra, at 944 (“[L]awmaking processes such as bicameralism and
presentment or notice-and-comment rulemaking promote caution, deliberation, and
accountability.”).
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process laid out in the Constitution recognizes that electoral accounta-
bility alone is not a sufficient protection against bad government.169
One may argue that agency rulemaking does not side-step that con-
straint because agencies can act only within the authority granted to
them by duly enacted statutes.170  But that argument has little
purchase because, by necessity, such grants of authority tend to be
virtually unbounded.  The complexity of the modern world essentially
requires that government regulate broadly with flexibility and speed
that pragmatically requires delegation of policymaking discretion to
agencies.171  Thus, once delegation occurs, a theory of strong presiden-
tial control raises the question of how the system should be structured
to filter good exercises of presidential discretion from bad ones, in
light of the weakness of electoral accountability.
Centralization of power to control agency rulemaking may also
exacerbate the problem of special interest influence.  Proponents of
presidential control contend that the President will be less susceptible
than agencies to such influence because he is responsible to a national
constituency and hence will not be beholden to any particular interest
group.172  Given the President’s universal authority, the cost of captur-
ing him will be great.173  But the relevant question is how that cost
compares to that of capturing all the institutions that influence
rulemaking in a decentralized system in which outcomes depend on
inputs of multiple actors.174  The answer to that question is not obvi-
ous.  Moreover, the value of garnering the President’s support in-
creases as his power to control regulatory outcomes increases,
169 See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 168, at 460 (interpreting the bicameralism re-
quirement as a way of imposing a supermajority requirement and thereby preventing the influ-
ence of special interest groups).
170 See Manning, supra note 168, at 899–900 (explaining courts’ acceptance of delegations
despite bicameralism requirements when the statute provides an “intelligible principle” for agen-
cies to implement).
171 See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section I: From Nondelegation to Exclusive
Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2153–54 (2004) (explaining that the scale of modern gov-
ernment makes delegations necessary); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Dele-
gated Power: A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 391, 404 (1987) (“Congress . . .
could not possibly make the hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of important policy decisions that
agencies make annually.”).
172 See Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rationalism in Regulation, 108
MICH. L. REV. 877, 902 (2010) (book review).
173 Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1305 (2006) (summarizing the arguments of proponents of presidential
control).
174 Kagan admits that this is the appropriate question, but answers it by asserting that in-
creasing presidential control will never imbue the President with sufficient control to replace the
“pluralist administrative system” in which we live.  Kagan, supra note 21, at 2337 n.347.
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encouraging rent-seeking interest groups to pay the higher cost of cap-
ture.175  There may be great competition to develop a close relation-
ship with the President, but the promise of being able to obtain one’s
preferred regulatory outcome by developing a relationship with a sin-
gle person makes that prospect attractive to those with the means to
compete.176  In addition, the susceptibility of the President to influ-
ence from special interest groups may be greater today than previ-
ously due to the enormous cost of running for President.177
III. DELIBERATIVE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
In light of the problems with the presidential control model, it is
not surprising that scholars have sought an alternative justification for
the administrative state.  Within the bounds set by the legislation au-
thorizing an agency to adopt rules, the nature of agency decisionmak-
ing provides optimism that policy will best serve the interests of the
nation as a whole.178  The deliberative promise of the administrative
state stems from the fact that agency decisionmaking can be inclusive,
knowledgeable, reasoned, and transformative.179
The paradigm for agency setting of policy, at least for policies that
generate political controversy or significant economic impact, is notice
and comment rulemaking.180  The notice and comment process re-
quires an agency seeking to adopt a rule to publish a notice of pro-
posed rulemaking (“NOPR”) in the Federal Register, which must
include either the text of the proposed rule or a description of the
subject of the rulemaking.181  The NOPR must alert the public to the
potential outcomes that might result from the rulemaking and must
even provide the information on which the agency relied to generate
175 See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 173, at 1306.
176 See id. (reasoning that special interest groups will have an equal advantage in providing
needed support to the President as they would to agencies, despite the higher cost of capturing
the President); Sargentich, supra note 110, at 27 (“[M]uch experience confirms that presidents
do respond directly to narrow, sub-national political interests.”).
177 In the 2012 presidential election, each candidate spent just shy of one billion dollars
directly on their campaigns.  Jeremy Ashkenas et. al., The 2012 Money Race: Compare the Can-
didates, N.Y. TIMES, http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/campaign-finance (last visited July 27,
2013).  In addition, outside groups spent over $282 million against President Obama or for Mitt
Romney, and over $68 million against Romney or for Obama. Id.
178 See Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification, supra note 28, at 1559–60.
179 See id.
180 See id.
181 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006).
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the rulemaking proposal.182  Once the agency has published the
NOPR, all interested persons are entitled to comment on the rule.183
Essentially, the class of interested persons includes any entity that
wishes to comment on the rules.184  Moreover, the comments can serve
any of several functions, including: contesting analyses in the NOPR
and predictions of the likely effects of the proposed rule; providing
information about the impact of the rule on subclasses of the public;
informing the agency whether the commenter favors or opposes the
proposed rule; and creating a record for judicial challenge to agency
findings and analyses.185  Thus the notice and comment procedure,
coupled with judicial review mandating agency explanation in light of
the comments it receives, is often held up as providing the meaningful
opportunities for public participation in the regulatory process.186
Usually agencies employ a rulemaking team to develop rules.
That team often consists of members from various offices within the
agency, each with its own expertise and professional outlook.187  Al-
though regulated entities often have the most knowledge about their
businesses and thus have an advantage in the regulatory process, the
professional training of agency staff members—together with their
ability to obtain information from regulated entities—allows the
agency to obtain and understand the information it needs to know
182 See Phillip M. Kannan, The Logical Outgrowth Doctrine in Rulemaking, 48 ADMIN. L.
REV. 213, 219–20 (1996) (noting that courts require that the NOPR provide an opportunity for
meaningful comment, which in turn requires “adequate time, the disclosure of data and law the
agency is relying on, and the rationale the agency is applying to connect the data and law to the
regulation it is promulgating”).
183 See id.
184 See Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts, the Agencies, and NEPA Threshold Issues, 55
TEX. L. REV. 801, 817 (1977) (remarking that any environmentally concerned citizen would have
standing to file comments on a rule that affects the environment).
185 Cf. Mariano-Florentino Cue´llar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV.
411, 420 (2005) (noting that notice and comment can provide agencies with information about
the consequences of particular proposals and of the strength of public approval of certain
policies).
186 See id. at 425 (explaining the effects of notice and comment procedures and their limita-
tions in influencing agency policy); David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules,
and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 316–18 (2010) (extolling the virtues of notice
and comment procedures for allowing members of the public to “mak[e] comments, rais[e] ob-
jections, and suggest[ ] alternatives to proposed” agency action, as well as create a record for
judicial challenge).
187 See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 144, at 1957 (describing how members of the
rulemaking team come from different professional backgrounds and communicate with profes-
sionals outside the agency); Thomas O. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 90–91 (1991) (noting that a “team model” for rulemaking provides
the advantage of “bring[ing] multiple professional perspectives” to complex problems).
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about what regulations should be imposed to minimize harm to those
affected by the conduct of regulated entities.188  In addition, the fact
that rulemaking teams often include professionals with different
knowledge sets and perspectives on regulatory alternatives fosters
agency regulation that takes into account the interests of the various
stakeholders in any regulatory matter.
Under current doctrines of judicial review, an agency that adopts
a rule must provide reasons why it believes that the rule promotes the
agency’s statutory responsibility.189  As the Supreme Court has made
clear, an agency must explain how relevant factors led it to believe
that the rule serves statutory goals, how its predictions for the impact
of the rule and the alternatives the agency considers follow from the
information available to the agency when it acted, and why it prefers
the adopted rule to plausible alternatives.190  Because the agency must
give reasons, and because the rulemaking team approaches issues
from a professional rather than a political perspective, there is reason
to be optimistic that the agency adopts rules that provide more than
mere deals between those groups with political power.191  More gener-
ally, proponents of deliberative justifications for the administrative
state find within that conception the possibility that participants, by
virtue of being sensitive to different values and perspectives, will be
willing to modify their own values opening up a richer set of outcomes
than those that might result from bargaining from fixed preferences.192
There is one overriding question that is problematic for propo-
nents of any deliberative conception of the administrative state: How
can they justify having an expert and rational but nonpolitical agency
choose an ultimate rule when that choice depends to a large degree on
value judgments?  By value judgments, I mean the weighing of the
188 Agencies can obtain information from regulated entities in several ways.  Most signifi-
cantly for developing rules, statutes grant most agencies broad authority to require such entities
to report specific information to the agency.  1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE 276 (5th ed. 2010).  In addition, many agencies have been given subpoena power by
statute.  Robert A. Mikos, Can the States Keep Secrets from the Federal Government?, 161 U. PA.
L. REV. 103, 116–17 (2012) (reporting that in 2012, Congress had passed over 300 statutes giving
agencies some sort of subpoena authority).  Both regulatory requirements and subpoenas for
information are valid if the information requested is sufficiently definite and reasonably relevant
to the regulatory program of the agency.  Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208
(1946) (establishing the standard for subpoenas); see also United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338
U.S. 632, 642–43 (1950) (establishing the standard for regulations requesting information).
189 See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park., Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415–16 (1971).
190 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43–44
(1983); Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416–17.
191 See Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification, supra note 28 at 1537–38.
192 See id.
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impacts or trade-offs that would result from adopting one particular
rule instead of various alternatives when the weight to be assigned to
those impacts cannot be derived from objective factors.  A value judg-
ment depends on the importance that particular individuals subjec-
tively assign to an impact or outcome.  In short, they are inherently
political decisions.  Thus, the question for proponents of a deliberative
administrative state is how to factor political influence into the
rulemaking process.
Since the rise of the presidential control model, there have been
several defenses of some form of deliberative administration that seek
to provide different answers to this question.193  Unfortunately, as de-
tailed below, none of them provides a satisfactory answer, either be-
cause each is unrealistically optimistic in its assumptions about the
potential for stakeholders to deliberate and reach consensus or be-
cause it simply fails to recognize the political nature of the decisions
facing agencies engaged in rulemaking.
A. Empowering the Public
One means of providing political influence in a deliberative
model of administrative law is to empower stakeholders or the public
directly to provide necessary input into agency rulemaking in such a
way that the agency will act in accordance with the values held by the
polity as a whole.194  For example, Nina Mendelson, in the foreword to
The George Washington Law Review’s Annual Review of Administra-
tive Law two years ago, addressed e-rulemaking as a potential means
of implementing online deliberative democracy.195  As she put it:
Public comments filed with an agency in reaction to a con-
crete proposal would seem to have considerable potential as
a source of information on citizen values and preferences.
The presence of significant and numerous public comments
in a rulemaking might at least trigger further investigation
and deliberation by an agency.196
Mendelson is not naı¨ve; she does not think that public comments
reflect a full understanding of the issues facing agencies when they
make rules.  Rather, she contends that although mass comments from
the public reflect a fairly unsophisticated understanding of the matters
at issue, they do provide some indication of the values the public holds
193 See infra Part III.A.
194 See Mendelson, supra note 117, at 1343.
195 Id. at 1344–45.
196 See id. at 1346.
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with respect to these issues.197  As such, they should be taken into ac-
count by the agency.  She understands that the agency may have supe-
rior information to that of the masses who file such comments, but
nonetheless believes that an agency should take into account such
comments when it is resolving necessarily value-laden issues and when
a supermajority of comments point in a direction different from that
which the agency would take.198  Mendelson is also sensitive to the
possibility that mass comments may reflect the influence of an interest
group and that the numbers of comments on each side of an issue may
reflect the relative ease with which focused groups can organize their
members to press the send button in response to emails asking them
to file pre-composed comments.199  She contends, however, that peo-
ple will not press the send button unless they agree with the
comments.200
Mendelson does not see judicial enforcement of a requirement
that an agency consider mass public comments as feasible.201  She sug-
gests that judicial review of agencies for failure to address such com-
ments is problematic because it will involve judges in evaluating
support for value judgments,202 an endeavor that she argues is inap-
propriate for the judiciary—an argument with which I wholeheartedly
agree.203  She instead proposes self-policing by an agency to acknowl-
edge at least that its decision is contrary to the weight of such com-
ments, and perhaps to engage in additional procedures in the face of
such comments, though to what end she does not specify.204
Some other scholars have gone beyond suggesting improvements
in greater agency consideration of public input, recommending the use
of a civil jury in rulemaking to deliberate and provide input to the
agency on the public’s values.205  Although the jury would be ran-
domly selected to make it representative of the public’s views, the
small size of any deliberative jury would compromise its representa-
197 See id. at 1362; see also Cue´llar, supra note 185, at 414, 460–61, 468–69 (noting com-
ments by the public are less sophisticated, but still should be considered by agencies, as they are
highly relevant).
198 See Mendelson, supra note 117, at 1371–75.
199 See id. at 1375–76.
200 Id.
201 See id. at 1378–79.
202 Id.
203 See Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics, supra note 43, at 159–60.
204 See Mendelson, supra note 117, at 1379.
205 See BETH SIMONE NOVECK, WIKI GOVERNMENT: HOW TECHNOLOGY CAN MAKE GOV-
ERNMENT BETTER, DEMOCRACY STRONGER, AND CITIZENS MORE POWERFUL 152–53 (2009);
Cue´llar, supra note 185, at 491.
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tiveness.206  In this Issue of The George Washington Law Review,
David Arkush seeks to overcome the small size problem, proposing
instead what he terms “‘direct republicanism,’ in which large panels of
randomly selected citizens decide narrow, discrete questions of regula-
tory policy.”207  Although in the abstract he seems to favor delibera-
tion by stakeholders or the public, he does not advocate direct
deliberation by these juries because he claims such processes are too
resource intensive.208  Instead he would have the agency present to
these “administrative juries” discrete questions on regulatory matters,
such as an up-down vote on whether a rule should be adopted, along
with information that lay people could easily understand.209  After the
presentation, Arkush would allow the jury vote to dictate the outcome
on the question presented.210  He envisions this as a means of allowing
public input on values into the otherwise deliberative regulatory
system.211
All of these proposals, viewed as attempts to incorporate democ-
racy into the deliberative administrative state, fail because public com-
ments submitted to the agency do not—and I contend cannot—reflect
deliberation about questions of value raised by the rulemaking.212  Di-
rect input from stakeholders has limited worth as a signal of delibera-
tively determined popularity and intensity of the values between
which the regulatory decisionmaker must choose.213  The first problem
with direct input from stakeholders is that policy preferences involve
both values and knowledge about the impacts of the regulatory
choices.214  A stakeholder may prefer one value to another, but if she
206 See Arkush, supra note 26, at 1521–22.
207 Id. at 137.
208 See id. at 145.
209 See id. at 137–38.
210 See id. at 138.
211 See id. at 137.
212 See Jonathan Weinberg, The Right To Be Taken Seriously, 67 MIAMI L. REV. 149,
185–90 (2012) (arguing that notice and comment rulemaking does not involve a deliberative
dialog among members of the public, and that e-rulemaking will not enable it to do so).
213 To be fair to both Arkush and Mendelson, they do not claim to be seeking to justify a
deliberative model of administrative law, but rather to propose mechanisms that would improve
the extent to which agency rules comport with the values of the polity while maintaining deliber-
ative ideals. See Arkush, supra note 26, at 1462–63; Mendelson, supra note 117, at 1346–47.  In
fact, to the extent that Mendelson’s proposal merely sees e-rulemaking as providing information
that agencies should consider in their rulemaking, see infra notes 217–29 and accompanying text,
it essentially places the locus of deliberation with the agency, which I explicitly advocate in this
Article, see infra notes 316–21 and accompanying text.
214 Arkush recognizes that knowledge of the issues is an important point, and suggests
“testing juror’s knowledge or comprehension before accepting their input.”  Arkush, supra note
26, at 1501.
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is faced with a rulemaking choice that significantly interferes with the
second value but avoids only a minor interference with the first, she
may well prefer that choice.215  In other words, in order to make an
informed choice based on values, the stakeholder must understand in
some detail the trade-offs inherent in the regulatory choices.  And if
there is one thing on which most scholars agree, it is that individual
putative beneficiaries of agency rules and general members of the
public do not have the knowledge, resources, or incentives to learn
enough to comprehend those trade-offs, let alone to deliberate about
which trade-offs are warranted.216
Consider Mendelson’s example of the National Park Service
(“NPS”) rulemaking allowing the use of jet skis in two areas of the
Assateague National Seashore nearest the population centers of
Chincoteague Island, Virginia, and Ocean City, Maryland.217  She
noted that of the 7600 comments that the NPS received, 7264 favored
maintaining the complete ban on jet skis.218  The overall message of
her article essentially chides the agency for not engaging those com-
ments.219  Yet if those comments merely indicated opposition to jet ski
use without any statement of why the commenter opposed the use, the
agency cannot reliably read commenters’ values into them.  Perhaps,
for example, these comments reflected the views of environmentalists
who simply assume that the use of jet skis would harm the environ-
ment or disturb the peace and quiet in the area.  But the facts might
have indicated that there would be no noticeable effect on the envi-
ronment and that traffic in the area already compromised its tranquil-
ity.  The agency simply cannot know if those commenters would still
oppose the use of jet skis if they were knowledgeable about such facts.
Mendelson seems to signal her own opposition to an agency sim-
ply acquiescing to the preferences expressed by a supermajority of
comments when she discusses “a 1997 National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (‘NHTSA’) rulemaking regarding whether to
215 See supra text accompanying notes 143–46.
216 See Nzelibe, supra note 113, at 1254 (noting citizens are rationally ignorant as “the con-
sumer who does not work in the steel industry will have very little incentive to invest in acquiring
knowledge on all the vagaries of the steel industry tariff”); see also STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING
THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 33–39 (1993) (noting in the con-
text of evaluation of risk problems, the public’s evaluation of risk differs significantly from ex-
perts).  While the electoral process is different from the regulatory process, there is a common
problem in the electoral process of unsophisticated voters, who are ignorant about politics. See
Kang, supra note 145, at 1143.
217 Mendelson, supra note 117, at 1364.
218 Id.
219 See id. at 1364, 1367–69.
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permit [automobile] dealerships to install on-off switches for
airbags.”220  In that rulemaking, virtually all of the 600 comments from
the public favored allowing the installation of such switches for any-
one who wanted one as a matter of personal choice.221  The Agency
reasoned, however, that the public did not understand the costs and
benefits of airbags.222  It convened study groups to investigate whether
education of the public could quell their mistaken fears.223  After con-
vening these study groups, NHTSA “sharply restricted the availability
of on-off switches—but added a ‘public education information cam-
paign to put air bag risks and benefits into proper perspective.’”224
Mendelson characterized NHTSA’s response as “[a]n impressive
counterexample to the pattern of agency dismissiveness of public com-
ments.”225  Certainly, in terms of placating opponents to the rule by
making them feel that the agency listened to their views, it probably
was a wise response.226  Nevertheless, the key point is that the Agency
maintained its position that there were few instances in which a switch
to turn off airbags was warranted despite the overwhelming comments
preferring otherwise, and there was no indication that the education
program altered the public’s objection to the ultimate rule.227
Arkush might respond to the objection that members of the pub-
lic do not have the incentives or means to become sufficiently in-
formed to provide reliable signals of public values by contending that
his approach does not require a significant investment by members of
his administrative jury because the agency would present the informa-
tion it has developed to them at the end of its rulemaking process.228
Arkush, however, overestimates the ability of the agency to ade-
quately educate the public, as well as the potential for interest groups
to spin information to their advantage.  Most significant regulatory
matters are sufficiently complex that the agency could not simply in-
form members of Arkush’s jury of certain trade-offs.  There is much
uncertainty that has to be communicated and I suspect that arbitrarily
220 Id. at 1366.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 See id.
224 Id. at 1366 (quoting Air Bag On-Off Switches, 62 Fed. Reg. 62,406, 62,423 (Nov. 21,
1997)).
225 Id. at 1366.
226 Perhaps the Agency learned a lesson from its failed attempt early on to require an
ignition interlock in cars that would prevent them from being driven unless seat belts were fast-
ened. See supra note 166.
227 See Mendelson, supra note 117, at 1366.
228 See Arkush, supra note 26, at 1494–95.
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chosen members of the public will not have the ability or inclination
to understand the implications of these uncertainties.  Outcomes are
likely to be based on gross values rather than on a true evaluation of
trade-offs.
For example, consider climate change regulation by the EPA.  To
truly evaluate the trade-offs of such regulation, one would need to
appreciate the uncertainty of the likely effects on global warming,
which would require some evaluation of alternatives such as the costs
of adaptation and the potential for it to avoid these harms.229  Jurors
would also have to grapple with uncertainties in the cost of regulation
and the likely impact it will have on the problem.230  Even if provided
technical information by the agency, it seems unlikely that “John Q.
Public” would devote the time and effort to grapple with these issues
when he could vote based simply on whether he generally favors envi-
ronmental regulation as opposed to seeing regulation as government
overreaching.
A second problem with both Mendelson’s and Arkush’s propos-
als is that neither public comments nor votes of administrative juries
adequately signal the intensity of values; they only signal the number
of individuals who hold those values.  Again, consider jet skis in As-
sateague.231  The opponents may be environmentalists who live far
from the area and whose values are based on their principles about
human interaction with nature.  Although they might prefer banning
jet skis, that preference is likely not a major consideration in their
lives.  On the other side, those who favor jet skis may be individuals
who summer in Ocean City every year, and who strongly prefer to be
able to jet ski in Assateague.  The cost of commenting assures that the
preferences expressed to the agency at least meet some threshold
level.232  But as the cost of commenting decreases—reflecting both
electronic rulemaking and efforts by interest groups to email prepared
229 See Lakshman D. Guruswamy, Global Warming: Integrating United States and Interna-
tional Law, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 221, 224 (1990) (noting there are objections concerning “the scien-
tific uncertainties surrounding the existence, the effects, the consequences and the implications
of global warming”). See also generally J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural
Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363 (2010);
230 See Guruswamy, supra note 229, at 251–53 (discussing the trade-offs of combating
causes or effects of global warming).
231 See Mendelson, supra note 117, at 1364.
232 Commenting is costly because the commenter must become aware of the rulemaking,
educate herself about the issues and how they will affect her, and take the effort to write and
submit comments.  A rational person thus will comment only if the rule affects their interests
sufficiently to warrant incurring these costs. See id. at 1357–58 (discussing the impediments to
commenting by individuals).
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comments that individuals can forward to the agency with the click of
a mouse or a tap of the screen—the chance that public comments will
not reflect deeply held preferences increases.233
Finally, neither e-rulemaking nor administrative juries provide a
means to resolve highly contested debates about value.  Mendelson’s
mechanism only provides information when there is a sufficient
supermajority regarding the preferred value, and hence the value is
not really contested.234  Arkush’s mechanism merely registers existing
values, which means that the result for truly contested values is likely
to reflect the make-up of the particular jury or, at the very best, grant
victory to one side in the debate because its preference enjoys a slim
advantage among the polity.235  Under Mendelson’s proposal, an
agency might engage in proceedings that involve the public beyond
notice and comment236 and these might foster some deliberation
among stakeholders.  Nonetheless, the prospect of true deliberation
by the general public is unlikely.237  Arkush’s proposal entirely forfeits
the possibility of public deliberation by jurors that might help change
preferences to encourage a consensus on the best ultimate decision.238
B. Collaborative Governance
Collaborative governance, as most notably developed by Jody
Freeman,239 provides a second possible approach for transcending the
debate about deliberation and democratic accountability.240  The
workings of this approach are difficult to pin down, because its de-
mands vary with context, but the fundamental idea of collaborative
233 Cf. Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public Participation and Political
Institutions, 55 DUKE L.J. 893, 931–34 (2006) (discussing a user-based rating system of comments
to ease the agency burden of evaluating the value of specific comments in a world of torrents of
electronic comments, and the impact of electronic commenting on quantity and quality of
comments).
234 See Mendelson, supra note 117, at 1375.
235 See Arkush, supra note 26, at 1526 (stating that “whether administrative jurors merely
vote their preexisting preferences or have their views shaped through the proceeding, and
whether they assume a spirit of public-interestedness” is a matter still to be tested).
236 Mendelson, supra note 117, at 1376–77.
237 See Benjamin, supra note 233, at 933–35 (explaining that the use of the internet has not
increased the overall quantity or quality of comments).
238 See Arkush, supra note 26, at 1502–03.
239 See generally Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1, 21–31 (1997).
240 Others who similarly advocate allowing stakeholder representatives to negotiate rules
or norms of conduct include advocates of “new governance.” See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Renew
Deal: The Fall of Regulation and The Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89
MINN. L. REV. 342, 376–79 (2004).
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governance is to encourage stakeholder representatives to interact di-
rectly in a problem-solving mode about matters that call for regula-
tory solutions.241  The goal is for these interactions to allow
participants to overcome traditional adversarial postures, and ulti-
mately to arrive at consensus win-win solutions.242  In the context of
agency regulation, Freeman discusses negotiated rulemaking as a
promising vehicle for implementing collaborative governance in ap-
propriate contexts.243
Although Freeman developed collaborative governance as a
means to alter the usual criteria for accountability and legitimacy, at
least in the context of rulemaking,244 the approach can be character-
ized as an attempt to import democratic influence into regulatory de-
cisions via deliberation by representatives selected by each
stakeholder group.  As James Madison recognized and our Constitu-
tion reflects,245 there are distinct advantages in relying on chosen rep-
resentatives of the people rather than the people themselves to make
the value choices embedded in regulation.246  Representatives will be
chosen for their knowledge about and dedication to addressing issues
that affect their stakeholder groups.247  They are therefore capable of
assessing the trade-offs that result from available regulatory choices
and are motivated to do so.248  Reliance on representatives can also
keep the individuals who have to interact in the deliberative process
to a manageable number.  Though it would be ludicrous to think that
the thousands or sometimes millions of direct stakeholders in a
rulemaking will ever reach consensus on what action is appropriate, it
is at least possible that twenty or so representatives could actually
agree on a best rule.249
Unfortunately, there are still reasons to remain extremely skepti-
cal that collaborative governance can provide the legitimating input
241 See Freeman, supra note 239, at 22.
242 See id. at 24.
243 Id. at 35–36; see also Lobel, supra note 240, at 344 (characterizing negotiated rulemak-
ing as a form of new governance).
244 See Freeman, supra note 239, at 30–31.
245 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
246 Id.
247 Id. (stating that the republican model leads to the election of candidates “who possess
the most attractive merit,” among other qualities).
248 Id. (explaining that in a republic, decisions are passed “through the medium of a chosen
body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose
patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
considerations”).
249 See id.
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about public values that seems missing from deliberative models of
the administrative state.  The most fundamental problem is incom-
pleteness of representation.  Someone (in the negotiated rulemaking
example, the agency) has to convene the representatives of those
stakeholder groups sufficiently affected by the matter.250  Invariably,
representatives of some groups are excluded from the deliberations,251
which transfers the controversial decision point from choosing the reg-
ulation to choosing the regulators.252  Proponents of collaborative gov-
ernance need some mechanism to guard against the idiosyncratic
preferences of the agency or the influence of focused interest groups
in restricting who gets to sit at the table.  In her seminal article, Free-
man recognizes this problem in the context of negotiated rulemak-
ing.253  She notes that it is therefore important to require the agency to
go through the usual notice and comment process, as well as judicial
review, to ensure that those who are not included in the negotiations
get some chance to make their case.254  It is also imperative to Free-
man that the agency have discretion to reject the negotiated rule if it
has reason to believe that the outcome of the negotiations do not best
further the public interest.255  What Freeman fails to recognize is that
the need for such requirements to ensure sufficient input by all stake-
holder groups makes manifest collaborative governance’s inability to
provide complete representation of stakeholders.
Yet another reason to be skeptical that collaborative governance
can provide democratic legitimacy to deliberative administration
stems from the improbability that interest group representatives will
actually reach a consensus on values underlying rulemaking choices.256
A representative of a stakeholder group often is the individual most
250 See Freeman, supra note 239, at 31.
251 See id. at 79–81 (stressing the importance of broad participation, but recognizing that in
some instances it may not be feasible, and proposing alternatives to reduce the impact of the
absence of certain stakeholders).
252 See Laura I. Langbein & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Regulatory Negotiation Versus Conven-
tional Rule Making: Claims, Counterclaims, and Empirical Evidence, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. &
THEORY 599, 609 (2000) (reporting, based upon the result of a survey, that thirty-four percent of
participants in negotiated rulemaking believed that some affected interests were not included on
the negotiating committee).
253 Freeman, supra note 239, at 77–78.
254 Id. at 35.
255 Id.
256 See Richard B. Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Ad-
ministrative Regulation, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 655, 674 (“[M]any advocacy groups often have a
strong ideological commitment to a cause; as a result, such groups may be more likely to fight for
their preferred outcome as a matter of principle and less likely to accept compromise.”).
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committed to the values underlying her group’s interests.257  She is not
like an elected official, who is voted on by constituents to represent
their interests, but does not have a direct interest in the matter her-
self.258  Instead, interest group leaders are policy entrepreneurs who
often have created the groups that they represent.259  Given the time
and energy it takes to organize such a group, especially one whose
members share a diffuse interest in a regulatory matter, these repre-
sentatives are less likely than individual stakeholders to compromise
or change their values.  Moreover, the mechanisms by which some in-
terest groups maintain their viability create agency costs that reinforce
group leaders’ propensity not to amend their positions in light of de-
liberation.260  A group, especially one that represents extreme prefer-
ences in heated controversies, may lose its raison d’eˆtre if those
controversies are resolved.261  Intransigence and extreme stances often
generate publicity that increases group membership, even when the
true interests of group members might be better served in the long run
by compromise and more moderate positions.262
In light of these observations, it is not surprising that experiments
with collaborative governance have rarely succeeded, or have suc-
ceeded only by abandonment of the principles of collaboration.  First,
it has remained relatively rare for agencies even to attempt negotiated
rulemaking.263  Among those agencies that have tried, only a few have
succeeded.264  Many attempted negotiated rulemakings stalled be-
257 See David C. King & Jack L. Walker, Jr., The Origins and Maintenance of Groups, in
MOBILIZING INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICA: PATRONS, PROFESSIONS, AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
75, 99–100 (Jack L. Walker, Jr. et al. eds., 1991) (positing that if the interest group were to
change their position in a way that shifted from a donor’s position funding would vanish, result-
ing in dire consequences for the group’s existence).
258 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
259 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
260 See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies: Evaluation of
Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74 GEO. L.J. 1625, 1641
(1986) (noting that public interest groups do not have an incentive to compromise, but do have
an incentive to litigate because “publicity associated with a dramatic victory and extreme state-
ments made in litigation tend to facilitate fund raising and other facets of membership support”).
261 See Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders, supra note 72, at 436 (“[G]roups that provide
mostly expressive and solidary benefits may not have incentives to accommodate welfare-in-
creasing regulatory programs reasonably.  Such groups generate and maintain support by adher-
ing to ideological positions.”).
262 See id. at 439 (“Reports of strong stances taken against adversaries may attract more
attention, and therefore more money, than reports of negotiated accommodations that actually
provide group members a modicum of tangible benefits.”); Perritt, Jr., supra note 260, at 1641.
263 Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated
Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1276–77 (1997).
264 See id. at 1275.
2013] THE ROLE OF POLITICS 1439
cause of a lack of consensus among members of the negotiating com-
mittee;265 at least one failed upon implementation because, although
the proposed rule seemed to reflect consensus, it left contentious is-
sues unresolved.266  Other experiments such as the EPA’s “Project
XL” have achieved consensus only in select contexts, and then usually
only because the Agency explicitly excluded hardline groups in the
process of developing XL plans.267
C. Impropriety of Electoral Politics
Variants on a third approach for resolving questions of the demo-
cratic legitimacy of deliberative models of the administrative state can
be found in the works of Glen Staszewski268 and Evan Criddle.269
Both of these scholars are skeptical that the political system holds
lawmakers publicly accountable in a meaningful way.  Hence, both
suggest that attributes of agency decisionmaking other than the influ-
ence of Congress or the President provide the democratic accountabil-
ity that legitimates the deliberative model.
For Staszewski, the key element that provides accountability is
the requirement that agencies give reasons for their decisions.270  He
argues that reason-giving fosters accountability in several ways.  First,
it limits the scope of agencies’ policymaking discretion.271  Second, it
facilitates transparency, allowing for more meaningful public discus-
sion, evaluation, and criticism of government action.272  Third, it “fos-
ters democratic legitimacy because it both embodies, and provides the
preconditions for, deliberative democracy that seeks to achieve con-
sensus on ways of promoting the public good that take the views of
political minorities into account.”273  According to Staszewski, reason-
giving is such a powerful palliative for the failures of electoral politics
that he claims it is a “viable alternative to elections for purposes of
holding public officials democratically accountable.”274  Thus, for him,
politics should be irrelevant to agency setting of policy.
265 Id. at 1274.
266 Id. at 1304–05.
267 See Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders, supra note 72, at 474 n.279.
268 See generally Staszewski, supra note 118.
269 See generally Criddle, supra note 119.
270 Staszewski, supra note 118, at 1279–80.
271 Id. at 1279.
272 Id. at 1281–82.
273 Id. at 1278.
274 Id. at 1284.
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I am on record arguing that judicial review of agencies’ reasons
for rulemaking serves many of the goals that Staszewski identifies.
For example, I have written that requiring reasons restricts the availa-
ble regulatory choices open to an agency by ferreting out pretexts for
prohibited or politically unpopular considerations,275 encourages more
careful agency consideration of regulatory problems,276 and increases
transparency and hence the potential for electoral accountability of
the impacts of agency rules.277  Unfortunately, Staszewski’s assertion
that reason-giving can replace political accountability, in my mind,
strains credulity.
Staszewski’s reliance on reason-giving suffers from the same criti-
cism that prompted the rejection of the expertise model in the 1950s
and 60s.278  This reliance only makes sense if reason-giving entirely
eliminates the need for value judgments to resolve agency policymak-
ing.279  Just as the expertise model assumed that controversy over the
wisdom of policy would vanish if everyone had the knowledge and
experience of the expert,280 Staszewski assumes that policy contro-
versy is entirely resolvable by objectively accepted reasons.281
Essentially, this assumption implies that Staszewski believes that,
at the conclusion of the rulemaking process, deliberation will lead to a
single “best” rule rather than a choice of reasonable rules that de-
pends on value judgments.282  Otherwise, his statement that reason-
giving provides a substitute for elections cannot be true because it
would give no mechanism for reaching the ultimate outcome on a reg-
ulatory matter.283  Staszewski does, at one point, seem to admit that
politics is appropriate for resolving value-laden choices, but he sees
reason-giving as leaving room for such choices so infrequently that he
sees politics as, at best, a “tie breaker” in the unusual case when delib-
eration does not lead to a single best outcome.284
275 Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules, supra note 30, at 491.
276 Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 491 (2002) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing].
277 Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics, supra note 43, at 178–79.
278 See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text (discussing problems with the expertise
model).
279 See supra note 50–53 and accompanying text.
280 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
281 See Staszewski, Reason-Giving, supra note 118, at 1286.
282 See Staszewski, Political Reasons, supra note 130, at 898–99 (explaining why delibera-
tive decisionmaking should precede political considerations).
283 See id.
284 Id. at 899–900.
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Staszewski’s belief that agencies can resolve policy questions by
purely objective reasoning seems unduly optimistic.  First, there is the
problem that agency knowledge is incomplete so that decisions must
be made based on much uncertainty about their likely impacts.285
Resolution of policy under such uncertainty depends not only on tech-
nical decisions, but also on value judgments, such as desired attitudes
towards risk and ethical considerations.286  More significantly, even
when the agency can predict the outcomes of possible regulatory
choices with certainty, evaluation of the trade-offs between those out-
comes often still requires value judgments.287  Consider, for example,
the FCC change in policy to prohibit fleeting expletives on the public
airwaves that the Supreme Court considered in FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc.288  When all was said and done, the agency decision
weighed the costs of implementing a system to bleep out such words
against the discomfort that some parents feel when their children are
exposed to curse words.289  I cannot think of any reasoned basis that
definitively shows one harm to be less than the other.  Similarly, con-
sider the gag rule that the Court considered in Rust v. Sullivan.290
Suppose that the Department of Health and Human Services had re-
sponded to comments expressing concern over the effects on women
for whom pregnancy posed a significant health risk by determining
285 See Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1613, 1618–28 (1995).
286 See id. at 1620 n.22; Robert L. Glicksman, Bridging Data Gaps Through Modeling and
Evaluation of Surrogates: Use of the Best Available Science to Protect Biological Diversity Under
the National Forest Management Act, 83 IND. L.J. 465, 471 (2008); Guruswamy, supra note
229229, at 224; see also HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECI-
SION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION 47–51 (3d ed. 1976) (noting that
choices of intermediate ends by agencies involve both factual judgments and value choices).
287 See Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest, and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72
VA. L. REV. 271, 281 (1986) (noting that technical information “will rarely be conclusive, how-
ever, and its usefulness will often depend upon value judgments, which must be made in accor-
dance with the governing statute”); see also Thomas O. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural
Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in
EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729, 743 (1979) (“Situations occasionally arise, however, when
even after distilling out the pure scientific judgment question, eminent scientists still disagree
over how to interpret the data, and the regulator’s resolution of the issue once again must be
policy-dominated.”).
288 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 508–10 (2009).
289 See id. at 506–10.  The trade-off inherent in the decision might also have included the
possibility that some smaller broadcasters that could not afford such a system would choose not
to air a program out of concern for potential liability. See id. at 557–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the agency failed to consider this cost).
290 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 175 (1991) (upholding limits on Title X funding for abor-
tion-related activities).
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that the gag rule would result in several thousand fewer abortions but
an increase of several dozen women’s deaths during delivery.  Again, I
do not know of any reasoned way to weigh those two outcomes
against each other.291
Criddle’s work advocates viewing regulatory decisionmakers as
fiduciaries for the public.292  He contends that ultimate deci-
sionmakers in rulemaking proceedings should be representatives in
the Madisonian sense, using their own judgment rather than simply
implementing the preferences of the majority.293  Criddle then argues
that agencies are preferable to the President as fiduciaries because
they are experts, their decisionmaking process is transparent and par-
ticipatory, and they must provide reasons for their decisions.294
I am somewhat sympathetic to Criddle’s argument to the extent
that he suggests that judicial review encourages agencies to respect
views of those with “diverse ideological commitments,” and, in that
sense, be representative.295  But, ultimately, my critique of Criddle’s
work is somewhat similar to my critique of the work of Staszewski.
Criddle’s argument fails to acknowledge that the ultimate choice be-
tween rulemaking outcomes to a large extent reflects choices of values
that are unlikely to be resolved by consensus.  Although, unlike Stas-
zewski, Criddle does not suggest that agency expertise and reason-
giving lead to unique best rules, his reliance on these factors is still
problematic because neither factor is particularly useful for resolving
questions of value.296
Criddle’s reliance on the participatory nature of agency rulemak-
ing is problematic for more subtle reasons.297  Even granting that the
public’s rational ignorance of regulatory matters causes a disconnect
between electoral politics and the preferences of the polity,298 it seems
291 Note that there is still room for courts to require and review agency reasons under
“hard look” review.  As I have argued elsewhere, the agency in Rust v. Sullivan should have
been reversed because it failed to even attempt to predict the effect of the gag rule on deaths
during delivery. See Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron, supra note 4, at 110–11.
292 Criddle, supra note 119, at 448.
293 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); see also HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE
CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 192–96 (1967).
294 See Criddle, supra note 119, at 448.
295 See id. at 499.
296 See id. at 503.
297 See id. at 475–76.
298 See Ethan J. Leib, Can Direct Democracy Be Made Deliberative?, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 903,
909–10 (2006) (“[E]mpirical evidence also reveals that those who vote in ballot measure elec-
tions are older, more educated, richer, and more ideological than the general population.”); see
also Elizabeth Garrett & Mathew D. McCubbins, When Voters Make Laws: How Direct Democ-
racy Is Shaping American Cities, 13 PUB. WORKS MGMT. & POL’Y 39, 39, 47 (2008) (revealing
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likely that that disconnect is less than the disconnect caused by imper-
fections in agency participatory processes.  Commenting on a pro-
posed agency rule requires more detailed information, more work to
understand that information, and more effort to register one’s prefer-
ences than does voting.  Therefore, although voters receive imperfect
proxies about candidates from groups with whom they interact,299 it is
almost certain that very few individuals obtain sufficient information
to participate meaningfully in rulemaking proceedings.  More impor-
tantly, members of the public have little to no incentive to invest the
time and effort to obtain and understand such information, let alone
to submit comments in a rulemaking.300
Criddle himself seems to accept that the participation in rulemak-
ing does not inform agencies about majoritarian preferences any more
than a presidential election does.301  He merely argues that the imper-
fections in electoral politics undermine majoritarian preferences as a
legitimate basis for regulatory outcomes.302  He therefore rejects
majoritarian preferences as a basis for democratic legitimacy of
agency policy.303  Hence, by Criddle’s own criteria, the comparative
imperfections of elections and notice and comment proceedings for
registering majoritarian preferences are irrelevant.  Essentially the
question is not which institution is more likely to be accountable in a
majoritarian or interest group sense, but rather which is more ac-
countable in a representative sense.304
The question becomes who has a more legitimate claim to act on
behalf of the public—the President or the agency.  On this question, I
think agencies fare less well than the President.  First, as apolitical
experts, agencies are not trained in sorting out and evaluating the
strength of the values of different groups within the polity, even with
the help of rulemaking comments.305  Moreover, agency incentives to
that based upon their survey of exit poll voters in San Diego, a majority did not understand the
ballot propositions and approximately half who did answer questions regarding the content of
the propositions gave incorrect responses); Kang, supra note 145, at 1145–46 (discussing voter
ignorance of ballot measures).
299 See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text (critique of pluralist theories).
300 See Criddle, supra note 119, at 461 (“By all accounts, the vast majority of agency
rulemaking actions simply fly under the public radar, eluding the attention of all but the most
well-informed members of the electorate.”).
301 See id. at 488–89.
302 Id. at 457–64.
303 See id. at 489.
304 See id. at 488–91.
305 See PETER L. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 135 (2d ed.
2002) (“[T]he expert staff of all federal agencies, to a level that may reach as high as bureau
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evaluate values of the polity are significantly driven by pressure that
Congress and the President can bring to bear on them.306  Otherwise,
it is hard to see why agency career staff members, who are hired based
on merit, or the agency head and his political assistants, who are ap-
pointed and not elected, would care about the values of the polity.307
Hence, agency evaluation of public values derives from political
processes.  Finally, and most significantly, the President can claim that
the electorate chose him to use his judgment to further what he con-
siders to be the public interest.308  The agency can make no such claim.
In short, those who have recently sought to defend a deliberative
theory of the administrative state are unrealistically optimistic that
agency decisionmaking processes and the requirement of reasoned
decisionmaking enables stakeholders or their representatives to delib-
erate and reach consensus on what is best for the nation.  Alterna-
tively, they cannot explain why agencies are preferable to political
actors—particularly the President—for resolving fundamental issues
of values that are embedded in rulemaking decisions.
IV. INCORPORATING POLITICS INTO A MODEL OF DELIBERATIVE
ADMINISTRATION
Thus far, I have painted a picture of political control models as
imperfect because they forfeit some of the major advantages agencies
have in setting public policy.  In particular, they seek to strengthen
political controls, which would interfere with the apolitical expert per-
spective through which agency staff members tend to approach
rulemaking.  They thereby threaten to skew agency staff’s professional
evaluation of trade-offs from potential rules.  This is especially troub-
ling in light of the increased partisanship of legislators and elected
officials, and their tendency to spin issues and mislead the public
about the implications of the regulatory actions they support.309
head, is professional rather than political in character.  Its tenure and conditions of employment
are governed by the civil service laws, which in turn are administered by a somewhat complex
arrangement of bureaucratic agencies.”).
306 MARISSA MARTINO GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATED BUREAUCRATS?: POLITICS AND AD-
MINISTRATION DURING THE REAGAN YEARS 23 (2000) (pointing out with regard to role percep-
tion, “[c]areerists expressed quite eloquently and consistently their view that their actions during
the Reagan years were limited by their nonelected status, by the fact that they were and should
be hierarchically subordinate to the appointed officials in their agencies, and by the legitimacy of
those with an electoral mandate”).
307 See id. at 24 (noting that many civil servants believed that following the President was
“the right thing” to do).
308 See Kagan, supra note 21, at 2335.
309 See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.
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At the same time, recognizing that policymaking ultimately re-
quires value choices precludes simply rejecting politics as irrelevant to
rulemaking.310  Substituting direct agency discussion and evaluation of
political support for various regulatory options is unlikely to register
the values of the polity accurately or lead to consensus among stake-
holders.311  Therefore, the question for any deliberative model of the
administrative state is how to incorporate politics into the workings of
agencies in a manner that protects deliberative processes but still af-
fords a democratically justified means of resolving ultimate disputes
about values.
A. Agency Staff as Republican Guardians
For a deliberative model to include political influence on agency
policymaking without retreating from its ideals, the model has to be
honest in recognizing that the general public, direct stakeholders, or
stakeholder group representatives are poor choices within which to
expect deliberation to occur.  The information costs of educating
members of the public or direct stakeholders would be enormous, and
these individuals do not have sufficient incentives to devote the time
and resources necessary to be sufficiently informed and to deliber-
ate.312  Agency costs between stakeholder group representatives and
the members of their groups, along with the strong commitments of
most group leaders to their groups’ causes, make interest group repre-
sentatives an unlikely body for deliberation in most rulemaking pro-
ceedings.313  But not all is lost for deliberation, because agency staff—
interacting with the public and others in the executive branch in a
non-political manner—can serve as republican guardians of regulatory
action, and that the aim of the administrative state should be to foster
deliberation and consensus among staff members responsible for
agency rulemaking.
Members of the agency rulemaking team are professionals.  They
are well-educated in fields relevant to agency policymaking.314  Given
the need for an agency to explain the factual predicates for its rules,
rulemaking teams have to include professionals from different rele-
vant disciplines.315  Often these disciplines approach a particular pol-
310 See supra notes 50–54.
311 See supra Part III.
312 See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
313 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
314 See supra notes 184–88 and accompanying text.
315 See Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Mod-
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icy question with different perspectives and attitudes.316  Thus,
properly structured, administrative law can encourage rulemaking
teams to reflect many of the values and perspectives of the various
stakeholders affected by a regulatory matter and to gain valuable un-
derstanding from consideration of those various perspectives.317
Recognizing the agency staff as the locus of deliberation illumi-
nates how that staff should fit into the rulemaking process.  The role
of the staff should be to make factual determinations and predictions.
The staff also should identify plausible rulemaking alternatives and,
by its findings and predictions, clarify the trade-offs inherent in
choices between them.  In essence, staff is to resolve matters within
reason’s domain by reasoned decisionmaking.  In addition, agency
staff can also play a role by filtering from the possible alternatives
those that depend on extreme value choices that would so disrespect
the interests of some significant stakeholder group that it could not be
said to be the product of deliberation in which the views of all such
stakeholders are taken seriously.318  Independent of political influ-
ence, however, the rulemaking team should not be responsible for
choosing between outcomes whose trade-offs reflect different reason-
able valuations of impacts or regulatory perspectives.
ify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 493–94 (1997)
[hereinafter Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification].
316 See id.
317 See McGarity, supra note 187, at 57, 90–91 (noting that a “team model” for rulemaking
provides the advantage of “bring[ing] multiple professional perspectives” to complex problems);
cf. Josh Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand Juries, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 319,
333 (2012) (critiquing “contemporary criminal justice . . . [for] privileg[ing] one culturally con-
structed perspective above all others—specifically, the perspective of the professional law-en-
forcement community”); Timothy W. Floyd, The Lawyer Meets the Therapist, the Minister, and
the Psychiatrist: Law School Cross-Professional Collaborations, 63 MERCER L. REV. 959, 967
(2012) (describing how a course that included both law and theology allowed students to gain “a
valuable understanding of how people in different professions often approach social problems
from very different perspectives”); Charity Scott, Collaborating With the Real World: Opportuni-
ties for Developing Skills and Values in Law Teaching, 9 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 411, 432–33
(2012) (describing how, in classes with both law and medical students, students learned to appre-
ciate the perspective of those from a different profession).
Centralized review by the EOP also requires the agency to address the concerns of sister
agencies that often will have a different outlook and constituency with respect to a rulemaking
matter. See Sunstein, Myths and Realities, supra note 152, at 16–17.  And, because agencies must
report all planned rulemaking activity in the Annual Regulatory Plan and Unified Agenda of
Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, such interagency dialog can extend beyond rules subject
to OIRA review. Id. at 11–12.
318 See Weinberg, supra note 212, at 174–75 (describing agency rulemaking as reflecting a
right to be taken seriously out of respect for all citizens).
2013] THE ROLE OF POLITICS 1447
These roles for agency staff, in turn, explain some important doc-
trines of administrative law and give some concreteness to what those
doctrines entail.  For example, recognizing that deliberation occurs
within the agency staff deflects criticism of some otherwise troubling
aspects of notice and comment rulemaking.319  Often, the fundamental
provisions of agency rules are solidified by the time the agency issues
a notice of proposed rulemaking, well before rulemaking proceedings
could be said to involve the public or direct stakeholders in any poten-
tial deliberative process.320  Hence, notice and comment proceedings
do not encourage the agency to adopt rules that reflect public deliber-
ation.321  Rulemaking staff, however, has usually already reached out
to significantly affected stakeholders, collected information, and en-
gaged in significant deliberation in structuring the notice of proposed
rulemaking.322  The purpose of notice and comment, under the staff
deliberation model, is to ensure that the staff does not overlook signif-
icant interests of those whose perspective might not be represented by
a member of the rulemaking team.323  The fact that technical aspects
of regulatory controversies are usually resolved prior to notice and
comment does not interfere significantly with staff playing its deliber-
ative role.
319 See Bradley Lipton, Note, Accountability, Deference, and the Skidmore Doctrine, 119
YALE L.J. 2096, 2113–14 (2010).
320 See id. at 2114–16; Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Pro-
cess: Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 259
(1998); William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and Responsive-
ness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66, 74
(2004) (changes made in response to comments “seldom address the fundamental nature of the
policy”).
321 Weinberg, supra note 212, at 181–82 (noting that notice and comment comes after the
agency has invested much time and effort in building consensus around its rule, and that by the
time agencies receive comments, the agency is likely to be reluctant to change the rule in any
fundamental way).
322 E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492–93 (1992) (noting
that agencies rely on more informal processes than notice and comment procedures to obtain
information to develop rules); Kagan, supra note 21, at 2360 (“The President and his aides, no
less than any agency, have reason and means to consult with interested parties prior to making
regulatory decisions (or taking public actions that will foreordain them)”—i.e., prior to the pub-
lication of the NOPR).  For significant regulatory action even before an agency publishes a
NOPR, OIRA will have coordinated an exchange of information and views between the agency
proposing the rule and other agencies as well as interested offices in EOP. See Sunstein, Myths
and Realities, supra note 152, at 7–12, 16–18.
323 See Sunstein, Myths and Realities, supra note 152, at 17 (stating that “the governing
idea” for the consultation of multiple agencies is that “relevant agencies have information and
expertise, and the rulemaking agency should benefit from their perspectives before they finalize
or even propose rules”).
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Hard look judicial review is perhaps the most important require-
ment under the staff deliberation model.  By requiring the agency to
consider all relevant factors, hard look review encourages the staff,
who analyze any rule prior to its being adopted, to identify and con-
sider the perspectives of all who submit comments.324  According to
the psychological literature on accountability, because hard look re-
view focuses on the agency decisionmaking process, it encourages
careful analysis that reduces biases introduced by many decisionmak-
ing heuristics.325  Finally, the fact that agency staff plays a role in filter-
ing extreme rulemaking alternatives from consideration justifies the
uncertainty created by hard look review’s relevant factors test.326  Be-
cause the agency does not know the preferences of any panel that
might review a rule, it must consider all factors that any potential re-
viewing judge might find relevant.327  To do so, the agency staff must
have members with training and expertise in all the professions whose
knowledge may bear on a policy matter.328  The staff is thus more ca-
pable of seeing a regulatory issue from the perspective of the multi-
tude of stakeholders, and is unlikely to propose an alternative that
fails to pay serious consideration to the interests of any mainstream
interest group.
B. Politics and Agency Policymaking
The fact that agency staff tends to reflect various professional
perspectives, however, does not provide a sufficient guaranty of diver-
sity or a mechanism to ensure sufficient consideration of the public’s
values to claim that the rulemaking process inherently provides suffi-
cient democratic bona fides to justify agencies otherwise ignoring po-
litical influences.  Thus, additional mechanisms for political control
are needed.  Fortuitously, as those who promote the political control
model point out, both Congress and the President already exert great
influence over agency policymaking.329
324 See Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification, supra note 315, at 493–94.
325 See Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, supra note 276, at 517–18.
326 See Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification, supra note 315, at 496–97.
327 See id. at 496–97.
328 See id. at 493–94.
329 See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 21, at 2281–2319 (describing in detail how President Clinton
controlled much agency rulemaking); Watts, supra note 15, at 35 (asserting that “[t]he political
control model of agency decisionmaking . . . legitimizes agency decisionmaking by stressing that
agencies are subject to political control”); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, Mixed Signals: Re-
considering the Political Economy of Judicial Deference to Administrative Agencies, 56 ADMIN.
L. REV. 657, 667 (2004) (reporting “strong evidence of presidential influence over agency
policy”).
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Agencies are not free to make policy entirely as they see fit.
First, although it is almost so obvious that it is often neglected as a
means of political control, agencies cannot act beyond the authority
that statutes grant them or otherwise contrary to statutory direction.330
Second, the President can exert great influence over agencies by ap-
pointing agency heads who agree with his political perspectives, sub-
ject to Senate confirmation and other political constraints on his
appointments.331  The President can also fire at-will high ranking
members of “executive” agencies (as opposed to “independent” agen-
cies).332  Currently, the President also exercises significant influence
over agency rulemaking via OIRA review.333  Although OIRA’s posi-
tions on rules may not track those of the President with complete ac-
curacy, the interaction between OIRA and the White House makes it
likely that such review will protect against significant agency drift
from a position that the President supports.334  Third, the President
and both houses of Congress have the ability to call attention to as-
pects of agency decisions in a manner that can bolster or hurt the rep-
utation of the agency head and the agency as a whole.  For example,
congressional committees hold hearings to focus attention on agency
decisions that have not worked out well.335  Presidents can use the
bully pulpit to shore up support for agency policies that they sup-
330 See Kagan, supra note 21, at 2255.
331 See Bagley & Revesz, supra note 173, at 1302 (asserting that numerous studies show
that “presidents exert considerable power over agency action through their power to appoint
loyalists to influential administrative posts”); Note, Independence, Congressional Weakness, and
the Importance of Appointment: The Impact of Combining Budgetary Autonomy with Removal
Protection, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1822, 1834–35 (2012) (explaining the significance of the Presi-
dent’s appointment power).
332 See Cristina M. Rodriguez, Constraint Through Delegation: The Case of Executive Con-
trol over Immigration Policy, 59 DUKE L.J. 1787, 1822 (2010) (“Though no single definition of an
independent agency exists, such agencies tend to be defined by restraints on the president’s
authority to hire and fire their members.”).
333 See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3
C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. I 2009); see also Sunstein,
Myths and Realities, supra note 152, at 8–10 (summarizing OIRA review under these executive
orders).
334 Sunstein, Myths and Realities, supra note 152, at 34 (“Insofar as the President and his
closest advisers are clear on their priorities, OIRA will of course be made aware of their views
and act accordingly.  Those involved in the OIRA process are alert to the concerns and priorities
of the President himself, and they take direction from him.”).
335 See Beermann, supra note 77, at 124–25 (describing committee oversight of agency ac-
tion); Richard J. Lazarus, The Neglected Question of Congressional Oversight of EPA: Quis Cus-
todiet Ipsos Custodes (Who Shall Watch the Watchers Themselves)?, 54 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 205, 208 (1991).
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port.336  Perhaps most significantly, especially in the current climate
opposing tax increases and unnecessary government spending, an
agency needs the support of both the President and members of con-
gressional committees who oversee it in order to secure appropria-
tions that will allow it to implement its preferred programs.337  Thus,
these political players wield significant power to limit agency funds
either for particular programs with which they disagree, or even to
limit the agency budget in general if the agency consistently ignores
their policy preferences.
I do not mean to suggest that political influence will dictate pre-
cise agency outcomes in most or even many agency rulemakings.  But
they do constrain agency policies so that the deviation from the pref-
erences of its political principals is not so great as to trigger a reaction
that will negatively affect the head of the agency or the workings of
the agency overall.338  The extent of leeway an agency has in any par-
ticular rulemaking depends on the relative preferences of its overseers
and the importance of the matter to them.339
Some have argued that the agency can play one overseer against
the others to increase the range of its stable policy outcomes.340  Thus,
according to a now well-known positive political theory analysis done
by McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, agencies can change policy out-
comes from the status quo as long as they remain within their statu-
tory authority and the change is preferred by the House of
Representatives, the Senate, or the President.341  Their argument is
that if any of these institutions is better off after the agency policy
change, it will resist efforts by the other institutions to force the
agency to return to its original policy.342  Though this analysis is illumi-
336 See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 144, at 1982–83; Heidi Kitrosser, Accountability and
Administrative Structure, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 607, 638 (2009).
337 See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional De-
sign, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 42–43 (2010); Thomas H. Hammond & Jack H. Knott, Who Controls
the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureau-
cratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policy-Making, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 119, 124
(1996) (reporting that many studies support the theory that the President plays “an agenda-
setting role for congressional deliberations on agency appropriations”).
338 See Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification, supra note 28, at 1551.
339 See Nou, supra note 141, at 1781 (“As the preference divergence [between the agency
and President] grows and the costs of reversal diminish, the President will be more likely to
reverse the agency.”).
340 See McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures, supra note 19, at 260–61 (“This may
come about when conflicting interests among the political overseers creates conflicting pressures
on the agency.”).
341 See id. at 248–53.
342 See id. at 252.
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nating, it treats each regulatory issue as a one-time game.  In reality,
however, the agency’s political principals—the House, the Senate, and
the President—interact repeatedly over policy, and often will trade off
deviations from their ideal positions that they care about only moder-
ately to minimize deviations on issues they care about more deeply.
The influence exerted by political actors is thus more complex, and
the space left open to agencies is likely less broad than the authors
predict.  What is most compelling about their work, however, is the
broader point that agencies operate in the shadow of political influ-
ence, and therefore that agencies generally will avoid outcomes that
will likely prove unstable or will harm the agency’s programs over-
all.343  The implication of such influence is that even for rulemaking
about which the political principals have not communicated their pref-
erences, the agency outcome likely deviates from the preferences of
each principal insufficiently to qualify as a significant deviation from
the widely shared values of the politically accountable branches.344
To be clear, I am not arguing that political controls are entirely
sufficient to justify the administrative state.  Unlike those who advo-
cate for a political control model, I believe that there are limits to the
extent that political influence should dictate outcomes.  In particular,
political influence should not undermine the deliberative benefits that
agency rulemaking delivers.  At the same time, unlike others who ad-
vocate for a deliberative model of rulemaking, I am not arguing that
agencies should be free from all external political control.  Hence, un-
like those other advocates, I do not find political influence inherently
suspect.  If elections are to mean something, political influence must
be part of the deliberative process.345
This still leaves questions about the appropriate nature of politi-
cal influence in those cases where political principals do communicate
their preferences.  First, I am convinced that direct presidential influ-
ence on agency rulemaking should take primacy over that of Con-
gress.  Pragmatically, no individual can speak for Congress as a whole,
opening up the possibility of obfuscation about precisely which poli-
cies Congress supports and who is responsible for influence on regula-
tion.346  Lack of centralization of congressional influence would also
343 See generally id. at 243–44.
344 See id. at 274.
345 See Ronald M. Levin, Hard Look Review, Policy Change, and Fox Television, 65 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 555, 561 (2011) (opining that “elections should have consequences”).
346 See Arkush, supra note 26, at 1478 (explaining that “the notion of ‘congressional’ over-
sight, in the sense of the whole Congress watching over regulators, is rarely more than a
metaphor”).
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forfeit opportunities for consistency and coherence of policies that cut
across programs.347  Perhaps most importantly in today’s world of dys-
functional politics, some members of Congress seem willing to do
whatever they can to undermine agency implementation of policy with
which they do not agree, or even that with which they might agree but
for which members of the other party might claim credit.348  Granting
primacy to congressional influence would allow those who lost at the
statutory enactment stage to throw wrenches into the workings of
agencies to disable them from carrying out their authorized mandates
or even to disable government entirely.  The President, who is likely
to be evaluated by the success of agencies in implementing his poli-
cies, may try to influence agency implementation of statutory man-
dates, but is unlikely to try to disable them entirely.349  Hence, for
those rulemaking matters about which the President has taken a pub-
lic stance in a way that respects the deliberative processes of the
agency, the agency should choose the deliberatively justifiable rule
that best reflects that stance.350
Presidential involvement, in an institutional sense, actually can
facilitate deliberation by establishing a centralized process for agen-
cies to learn about and coordinate their rulemaking with the concerns
of other agencies and various offices within the EOP.351  This can ex-
pand the diversity of perspectives considered during deliberation be-
yond those directly represented by agency staff.  In large part,
coordinating such a process seems to be a major role of OIRA when it
reviews agency rulemaking.352  Beyond this function, the President
347 See Kagan, supra note 21, at 2255 (stating that often Congress “could not reach agree-
ment on specifics, given limited time and diverse interests”).
348 According to Thomas Mann & Norman Ornstein’s evaluation of Congress: “The single-
minded focus on scoring political points over solving problems . . . has reached a level of such
intensity and bitterness that the government seems incapable of taking and sustaining public
decisions responsive to the existential challenges facing the country.” MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra
note 1, at 101.
349 See Kagan, supra note 21, at 2335 (explaining why presidents have an interest in ensur-
ing success of their policies even after reelection).
350 This does not mean that congressional influence is illegitimate.  It is legitimate for con-
gressional input to influence agency deliberation about value choices with respect to the vast
majority of rules that do not prompt personal involvement by the President.  For those rules that
do prompt presidential involvement, Congress can use threats of legislative battles and oversight
as means of influencing the President’s evaluation of the pros and cons of a rule.  On such mat-
ters, the President’s position as national representative of the people and responsibility to over-
see all administration puts him in a better position to weigh the significance of the preferences of
members of Congress, and whether a fight with them is worth the political costs.
351 See Kagan, supra note 21, at 2340–41.
352 Nou, supra note 141, at 1802 (“OIRA then coordinates a process whereby it attempts to
help refine and resolve arising issues through multiple rounds of comments and questions, fol-
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should be able to provide input into the value choices made by agen-
cies, so long as he does so without forfeiting the deliberative nature of
the rulemaking process.  Once an agency identifies the impacts of a
rule and filters out extreme alternatives, the ultimate choice of the
rule adopted reflects a value judgment that is appropriately left to the
President in his representative capacity.353  Ideally, the President’s role
in agency rulemaking, when he opts to get involved personally, should
therefore focus on choosing the final rule from those alternatives that
the agency has identified as plausible in light of statutory constraints
and predicted effects.  In addition, as the person chosen to exercise
discretion over regulatory values,354 the President should be free to
identify regulatory problems that he believes might warrant regula-
tory change.  In order for the polity to evaluate the President’s per-
formance as its regulatory representative, the President should
publicly reveal his personal involvement in agency policy-setting
rather than influencing rulemaking choices behind closed doors.355
Beyond these functions, presidential influence threatens to un-
dermine the professional and deliberate approach that agencies are so
well-suited to bring to regulatory problems.  If the President expresses
his preference for one rule over another prior to the agency complet-
ing its consideration of factual predicates and trade-offs, that expres-
sion is likely to bias the agency’s analysis to favor the President’s
preferred outcome, even to the point of the agency deciding technical
matters in a way that paints that outcome in a better light than it de-
serves.356  Worse yet, if the President communicates preferences be-
lowed by possible revisions and responses by the agency.”); Sunstein, Myths and Realities supra
note 152, at 34–35 (“[T]he OIRA [review] process helps to ensure that what [various federal
officials] know is incorporated in agency rulemakings.”).
353 See supra notes 96–107 and accompanying text; see also Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of
Politics, supra note 43, at 193 (explaining that once an agency identifies the impacts of a rule, the
political branches appropriately decide “whether the value judgments underlying the regulation
were warranted”).
354 See supra notes 96–107 and accompanying text (describing how representative account-
ability justifies allowing the President to make value judgments).
355 See Mendelson, supra note 121, at 1163 (explaining that submerged presidential influ-
ence may undercut responsiveness to national issues).
356 “When individuals are accountable to an audience whose own preferences are revealed,
these individuals . . . alter the outcome of their decisions to come closer to an outcome that
would satisfy their audience.”  Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, supra note 276, at 516 (citing Rich-
ard Klimoski & Lawrence Inks, Accountability Forces in Performance Appraisal, 45 ORGANIZA-
TIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 194, 202–03 (1990) and Philip E. Tetlock,
Accountability and Complexity of Thought, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 74, 80–81
(1983)); Philip E. Tetlock, Linda Skitka & Richard Boettger, Social and Cognitive Strategies for
Coping with Accountability: Conformity, Complexity, and Bolstering, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 632, 638 (1989)).
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hind closed doors, neither the courts nor the public will be alerted to
the potential bias such communications can cause.
Unfortunately, maintaining this ideal presidential role is virtually
impossible to implement in any legally enforceable manner.  The Pres-
ident can interact with agencies through many different mechanisms.
He can speak publicly about an issue, in essence using the press to
communicate with those in the agency.  He can speak directly with
political appointees within the agency or direct political appointees in
the White House or EOP about how he wants a particular rulemaking
to proceed.  Were courts directly to monitor these interactions to en-
sure the President does not deviate from the ideal role, they would
have to distinguish between deliberation-enhancing interactions and
those that are likely to stifle deliberation.  For example, on one hand,
an OIRA return letter or communication of concern about how an
agency performed its cost-benefit analysis of a major rule can be a
valuable check on a sloppy or agenda-driven decision.  On the other
hand, if the President has privately instructed OIRA about his choice
for a rule under review, such a letter might be a pretext for White
House opposition to an agency’s proposed rule for what Kathryn
Watts calls “raw” political reasons.357  Drawing such distinctions
would require mandating disclosure of all conversations between the
White House, EOP, and administrative agencies.  This likely would
interfere with the President’s constitutional authority to consult with
executive branch officials, even if that authority is seen as one of over-
sight rather than direct control.358  Nonetheless, small in-roads into
making presidential influence more transparent might be possible.
For example, Nina Mendelson’s proposal359—that each agency sum-
marize White House influence on rulemaking as part of its “concise
357 Watts, supra note 15, at 9 (defining “raw” politics as influence “unconnected in any way
to the statutory scheme being implemented”).
358 Although executive privilege is not absolute, communications from the President or his
close advisors about his positions on executive matters that do not reflect on any executive
wrongdoing are likely to be protected from a statute mandating disclosure. See In re Sealed
Case, 121 F.3d 729, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that “communications made by presidential
advisers in the course of preparing advice for the President come under the presidential commu-
nications privilege, even when these communications are not made directly to the President”);
Mary M. Cheh, Judicial Supervision of Executive Secrecy: Rethinking Freedom of Expression for
Government Employees and the Public Right of Access to Government Information, 69 CORNELL
L. REV. 690, 692 n.6 (1984) (describing an “internal deliberation” privilege that “presumptively
protects presidential conversations and correspondence”); see also Farina, supra note 97, at 421
(noting that “the George W. Bush Administration routinely refused congressional requests for
information relevant to agency and program oversight”).
359 Mendelson, supra note 121, at 1163–64.
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general statement of . . . basis and purpose”360—would help identify
whether the President communicated a preference for a particular
outcome in a manner and at a time that was likely to affect staff delib-
eration about the rule.361
There is also a problem that, once the President makes a commu-
nication that might adversely affect agency deliberation, there is no
satisfactory remedy to correct that effect.  The cat will be out of the
bag once the agency learns of the President’s preferences, and prohib-
iting the agency from acting in accordance with such preferences
might perversely take the most attractive policy alternatives off the
regulatory table.  Once again, I return to judicial review as a possible
bromide for improper presidential influence.  Hard look review fo-
cuses on those aspects of a rulemaking decision that are based on ob-
jective evaluations and the agency reasoning process.362  As such, it
sometimes illuminates technical assumptions, informational asser-
tions, and leaps of logic that the agency cannot support.  By doing so,
it can catch such problematic reasoning that may result from a desire,
whether conscious or not, to reach what the rulemaking team per-
ceives to be the President’s preferred outcome.363  In fact, if agency
staff believes that the rule stands a significant probability of an arbi-
trary and capricious challenge, it has an incentive to use greater ef-
forts to avoid such problems than it would absent judicial review.364
Additionally, the agency can use the prospect of judicial reversal to
resist political pressures from the White House.365  Hence, judicial re-
view will deter raw political decisions and biased or sloppy agency
analysis, as well as occasionally catch such analysis when it occurs.
The deliberative model’s requirement that judicial review en-
courage careful and reasoned agency analysis informs the nature of
360 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006).
361 See Mendelson, supra note 121, at 1163–64.
362 See Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics, supra note 43, at 148 (“[H]ard-look review is
structured to separate agency value judgments . . . from the empirical predicates that underlie
any particular rule, which should be based on objective analysis.”); Matthew C. Stephenson, A
Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 758 (2006)
(describing hard look review as “an evaluation of the government’s explanation of the reasoning
supporting that decision”).
363 See Levin, supra note 345, at 570 (stating that judicial review can promote political ac-
countability by debunking “insupportable explanations that agencies sometimes advance in or-
der to conceal politically charged value judgments”); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in
American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 61 (1985) (explaining that hard look review can flush
out “impermissible bases for regulatory action”).
364 See supra notes 324–28 and accompanying text.
365 Cf. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 889 (2009)
(noting that an agency can resist future political influence by adopting legally binding rules).
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such review.  It highlights that judicial review should not simply affirm
a rule solely because it is supported by the President, even if the Presi-
dent gives seemingly public interest-oriented justifications for his sup-
port.366  Politicians can give public interest justifications for virtually
any policy they prefer by spinning facts and analyses.367  Thus, judicial
review must focus on the objective reasoning of the agency decision
and not substitute statements of support by the President, or any
other political actor, for such analysis.  It is well understood that
courts vary the effort they use and the rigor they apply to hard look
review,368 depending on such factors as the importance of the decision
and the judges’ evaluation of the trustworthiness of the agency in-
volved to provide careful and unbiased analyses.369  The deliberative
model of administration suggests that courts should increase the rigor
with which they evaluate agency analyses when they suspect that the
agency deliberations were short-changed or biased.  In particular, this
would counsel that, contrary to Kathryn Watts’ recent proposal advo-
cating that courts apply less rigor when an agency adopts a rule that
the President has publicly supported,370 courts should apply more
366 Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics, supra note 43, at 197 (“[P]roperly understood,
judicial review under the reasoned decision-making standard precludes a court from considering
political influence as a basis for an agency rule, but nonetheless allows an agency to consider
such influence in rulemaking.”).
367 GUIDO PINCIONE & FERNANDO R. TESO´N, RATIONAL CHOICE AND DEMOCRATIC DE-
LIBERATION: A THEORY OF DISCOURSE FAILURE 18, 217 (2006) (noting “the incentive of politi-
cians and lobbyists to spread inaccurate views” and of “vote-seeking politicians” to engage in
“posturing”).
368 See Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics, supra note 43, at 196–97.
369 Kathryn E. Kovacs, Leveling the Deference Playing Field, 90 OR. L. REV. 583, 596
(2011) (“Empirical studies support the observation that, despite Congress’s deliberate and well-
considered decision to subject all agency action that is reviewable under the APA to the same
standard of review, the courts continue to apply different standards of review to different agen-
cies.”); see also Bradley C. Canon & Michael Giles, Recurring Litigants: Federal Agencies Before
the Supreme Court, 25 W. POL. Q. 183, 190 (1972); Donald W. Crowley, Judicial Review of Ad-
ministrative Agencies: Does the Type of Agency Matter?, 40 W. POL. Q. 265, 267 (1987); Roger
Handberg, The Supreme Court and Administrative Agencies: 1965-1978, 6 J. CONTEMP. L. 161,
167, 173 (1979); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75
U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 778 n.86 (2008).  Both scholars and judges have recognized that courts
apply a different level of deference under arbitrary and capricious review according to the im-
portance of the issues involved. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Paul Verkuil: An Outstanding Scholar
in His Spare Time, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2445, 2446 (2011) (remarking on Verkuil’s prescience
for predicting, among other things, “that courts would change their method of applying the arbi-
trary and capricious test to reflect the importance of the issues agencies were addressing in infor-
mal rulemakings”); Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership
Between Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 235 (1996) (“[T]here is certainly
some merit in the oft-heard complaint that different judges consider different factors significant
or important enough to corrode a rationale.”).
370 Watts, supra note 15, at 8.
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rigor in those situations where the President has supported or called
for the particular rule while the agency staff was still engaged in
deliberation.371
CONCLUSION
The structure and decisionmaking processes of administrative
agencies hold great promise for implementing deliberative govern-
ment.  Ultimately, however, agency rulemaking requires value judg-
ments underlying plausible choices of rules that the agency can
identify through its deliberative processes.  This Article contends that
agencies cannot directly register the values held by the polity neces-
sary to inform the ultimate choice between these alternative rules.
They must depend on political oversight to justify allowing them to
make such ultimate choices.  It further contends that, for rulemaking
in which the President personally dictates his preference for an out-
come at the end of the deliberative process, presidential preference
has greater legitimacy than the independent choice of the agency.  The
Article points out, however, that Presidential influence often occurs
before agency deliberation and hence biases the deliberative process.
The Article suggests that courts take this bias into account by increas-
ing the rigor of hard look review in the face of presidential expression
for a regulatory outcome prior to the agency completing its considera-
tion of a proposed rule.
371 Cf. Mark Seidenfeld, Strategic Interactions Between Administrative Agencies and the
White House: A Welcome Look into the Black Box of the Executive Branch, JOTWELL, (Mar. 6,
2013), http://adlaw.jotwell.com/strategic-interactions-between-administrative-agencies-and-the-
white-house-a-welcome-look-into-the-black-box-of-the-executive-branch/ (suggesting that evi-
dence of failed agency self-insulation from Presidential review might warrant more rigorous hard
look review from courts).
